AusNet

2027-32 Revised Resilience Program

Asset Management Strategy



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Abbreviations and Definitions

TERM	DEFINITION
AER	Australian Energy Regulator
AMS	Asset Management Strategy
ARI	Average Recurrence Interval
BCR	Benefit cost ratio
CAPEX	Capital expenditure
VNR	Value of Network Resilience

1. Executive Summary

This document sets out AusNet's revised 2027–32 proposal for network resilience capital expenditure (capex) to improve the resilience of eight transmission lines identified as critical to the Victorian transmission network. The revised proposal responds to the Australian Energy Regulator's (AER) draft decision and provides further explanation and evidence of AusNet's approach to managing its obligations related to network safety, including AusNet's duty to minimise safety risks as far as practicable.

AusNet's revised proposal applies two distinct assessment steps. First, for each of the eight critical transmission lines, it selects the highest line-resilience level for which the cumulative benefit cost ratio (BCR) remains above one. This captures all economically justified resilience benefits, rather than stopping at the option with the highest BCR. Second, it adds tower-specific works identified through the safety assessment as necessary to minimise safety risks as far as practicable.

AusNet has also addressed the AER's feedback on customer benefits and cost efficiency. The revised proposal demonstrates that the proposed strengthening works that are designed to unlock wholesale market benefits are economic where the BCR is greater than one, and that the program seeks to improve line resilience to the highest economically justified level. AusNet has also removed risk allowances and provided updated bottom-up cost build information to support the revised expenditure forecast.

The revised program will improve the resilience of the eight electricity market critical lines, but it will not bring all eight lines up to today's minimum design standard. Five of the eight lines will remain less resilient than newly constructed transmission lines because not all towers on those lines will meet current design standards. As a result, while the program will reduce the likelihood of tower collapse, it does not eliminate the risk of future collapse events because it is not economic to make transmission lines more resilient to extreme winds.

In response to AER's note in its Draft Decision that AusNet's initial resilience program did not include safety risks, AusNet has also incorporated a risk assessment to minimise safety risk from tower collapse to 'as far as practicable' levels, which is a regulated requirement under the *Electricity Safety Act 1998 (Vic)*. Further, [

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]. The progress towards this has informed the revised proposal.

As part of the safety risk assessment, AusNet undertook additional tower-level risk modelling for the eight critical transmission lines. This assessment identified elevated safety risk on three lines — SMTS-SYTS 1, SYTS-MLTS 1 and SYTS-MLTS 2 — where towers cross freeway or highway roads or are located in highly urbanised easements. The assessment identified 52 towers requiring treatment to reduce safety risk as far as practicable.

Of these 52 towers, 43 overlap with towers already included in the resilience-driven scope. The remaining nine towers on the SYTS-MLTS 1 and SYTS-MLTS 2 lines have, therefore, been added to the revised program to support AusNet's safety obligations. This increases the proposed strengthening volume from 164 towers in the initial proposal to 173 towers in the revised proposal.

Overall, AusNet considers the revised network resilience program to be prudent, targeted and cost efficient while delivering wholesale market and safety benefits in a way that is consistent with Victorian safety regulations. It responds directly to the AER's draft decision, provides additional evidence to support the proposed scope and expenditure, and incorporates safety-driven works required to manage elevated tower collapse risks on critical parts of the transmission network.

2. Introduction

This section outlines the purpose and scope of this document in relation to AusNet's revised proposal for the 2027-32 regulatory period.

2.1. Purpose

This document sets out AusNet's 2027-32 revised proposal for network resilience capex program. It presents key updates AusNet has made since AusNet's initial proposal. It should be read in conjunction with the Asset Management Strategies (AMS) included with AusNet's initial proposal.

2.2. Scope

Resilience is the capacity of the network to withstand and recover from the effects of a natural hazard or disaster. For this program, network resilience refers to strengthening transmission tower assets so they are less likely to fail during extreme wind events, reducing the likelihood and impact of prolonged transmission line outages.

AusNet's network resilience program has been developed in response to the collapse of 500 kV towers at Cressy in January 2020 and Anakie in February 2024. These events demonstrated that parts of AusNet's legacy tower fleet are exposed to wind conditions that can exceed the design requirements now applied under AS/NZS 7000 overhead line design. In particular, the winds experienced during the Anakie event exceeded the current minimum design standard, highlighting a material safety and resilience risk for existing transmission towers.

AusNet is separately undertaking a risk assessment of its tower fleet to assess the likelihood and consequence of tower collapse due to significant weather events, and to determine how the safety risks from the tower collapse can be minimised as far as practicable. Under Section 98 of the *Electricity Safety Act 1998 (Vic)* and subordinate safety regulations, AusNet has a General Duty to minimise safety risk to as far as practicable levels. While this risk assessment extends across AusNet's entire tower fleet and remains ongoing, it provides important context for the revised proposal and reinforces the need to improve tower resilience across the network.

The scope of this revised proposal is limited to the eight transmission lines included in AusNet's original proposal. These lines were selected following an assessment of the economic consequences of tower failure and a cost-benefit analysis which demonstrated that resilience investment was justified. The revised proposal retains this scope and supplements the economic case with an assessment of the safety benefits of tower strengthening works, including how they contribute to reducing safety risks to as far as practicable levels.

The eight[1] transmission lines included in the scope are:

- Loy Yang Power Station (LYPS) Terminal Station to Hazelwood Terminal Station (HWTS) 500kV transmission line No. 1 (LYPS-HWTS 1)
- LYPS to HWTS 500kV transmission line No. 2 (LYPS-HWTS 2)
- LYPS to HWTS 500kV transmission line No. 3 (LYPS-HWTS 3)
- South Morang Terminal Station (SMTS) to Sydenham Terminal Station (SYTS) 500kV transmission line No. 1 (SMTS-SYTS 1)
- SMTS to SYTS 500kV transmission line No. 2 (SMTS-SYTS 2)
- SYTS to Moorabool Terminal station (MLTS) 500kV transmission line No. 1 (SYTS-MLTS 1)
- SYTS to MLTS 500kV transmission line No. 2 (SYTS-MLTS 2)
- Ballarat Terminal Station (BATS) to Bendigo Terminal Station (BETS) 220kV transmission line (BATS-BETS)

[1] As outlined in the AMS 10-77 Transmission Line Structures submitted with the initial proposal, the Bendigo Terminal Station to Kerang Terminal Station (BETS-KGTS) 220kV transmission line has been removed from the resilience program because it overlaps with the Victorian Transmission Plan to build a new high-capacity double circuit line from Kerang/New Kerang to Bendigo by 2035. As such, only eight critical transmission lines have been proposed.

3. Background

This section provides an overview of AusNet's initial proposal for the network resilience program listed in section 2.2 and the corresponding AER's draft decision.

3.1. AusNet's Initial Proposal

AusNet's initial network resilience proposal was developed to address the risk of extreme wind events causing transmission tower collapse and extended outages on critical transmission lines, where resilience investment was demonstrated to be economically justified.

The proposal focused on strengthening towers on eight transmission lines identified as market critical. These lines were selected because tower collapse on these circuits could result in prolonged transmission outages and material market impacts, particularly given the role these lines play in supporting power system security and energy supply across Victoria.

The initial proposal was based on:

- identifying towers exposed to extreme wind risk using engineering assessments;
- selecting tower strengthening works, such as reinforcing tower crossarms, legs and bracing systems, as a lower-cost alternative to tower replacement;
- assessing the cumulative resilience benefit of strengthening towers on a transmission line basis, recognising that a line's resilience is limited by its weakest tower; and
- including works where the economic benefits of improved line resilience exceeded the cost of strengthening.

The initial proposal therefore sought to improve the resilience of the eight critical lines to the highest level that was economically justified, based on the information available at the time. It did not propose to strengthen all towers across AusNet's transmission network as it was not economically feasible.

AusNet's initial proposal included tower strengthening of 164 transmission towers across the eight critical transmission lines, as shown in Table 2. The proposed total expenditure for the program was $35.3m in real 2026–27 dollars.

Following the AER's draft decision and subsequent safety assessment work, AusNet has revised the program. The key changes are explained in section 4.

3.2. AER Draft Decision

3.2.1. AER alternative capex forecast

On 30 June 2026, AER published its draft decision, which provided alternative forecasts to AusNet's initial proposal for the network resilience program as shown in Table 1. The AER decided to reduce the total capex for this program to $13.6m, which is a 61.5% reduction from AusNet's initial proposal of $35.3m (total escalated cost including overheads in real 2026-27 dollars).

Table 1: AusNet's initial proposal and AER's draft decision ($m, real 2024-25 excluding overheads)[2]

Program	Initial proposal	Draft decision	Difference ($)	Difference (%)
LYPS-HWTS 1	4.7	0.2	-4.5	-95.7%
LYPS-HWTS 2	5.4	0.5	-4.9	-90.7%
LYPS-HWTS 3	3.3	1.2	-2.1	-63.6%
SMTS-SYTS 1	6.0	0.2	-5.8	-96.7%

[2] AER, AusNet Services transmission determination 2027-32 Draft Decision Attachment 2 – capital expenditure, June 2026, Table A-4, pg. 37 and 38, Draft decision | Australian Energy Regulator (AER)

Program	Initial proposal	Draft decision	Difference ($)	Difference (%)
SMTS-SYTS 2	1.2	1.2	0	0%
SYTS-MLTS 1	4.3	4.3	0	0%
SYTS-MLTS 2	4.4	4.4	0	0%
BATS-BETS	1.3	0.4	-0.9	-69.2%
BETS-KGTS	0.7	0.7	0	0%
TOTAL	**31.3**	**13.1**	**-18.2**	

As outlined in the AMS 10-77 Transmission Line Structures submitted with the initial proposal, the BETS-KGTS 220kV transmission line has been removed from the initial resilience program because it overlaps with the Victorian Transmission Plan to build a new high-capacity double circuit line from Kerang/New Kerang to Bendigo by 2035.

3.2.2. AER's reasons for its Draft Decision

The AER outlined its reasons for these reductions in Appendix A.4 of Attachment 2 capital expenditure AusNet 2027-32 draft decision.[3] These reasons have been summarised below.

3.2.2.1. Maximising customer benefits by selecting highest benefit cost ratio

The AER believes customer benefits are typically maximised at lower levels of strengthening than proposed by AusNet, where benefit cost ratios (BCR) are higher. In its analysis, it selected towers to be strengthened based on maximum BCR as shown in Table 2. It believes the costs for additional tower strengthening increases significantly while delivering relatively small additional benefits to customers.

Table 2: Comparison of AER's analysis and AusNet's initial proposal ($m, real 2024-25 excluding overheads)

Transmission lines	AER analysis				AusNet's initial proposal			
	Average Recurrence Interval (ARI)	Cost ($m)	No. of towers	BCR	ARI	Cost ($m)	No. of towers	BCR
LYPS-HWTS 1	50	0.2	1	18.27	1,000	4.7	25	1.80
LYPS-HWTS 2	50	0.5	2	8.48	1,000	5.4	28[4]	1.59
LYPS-HWTS 3	100	1.2	5	1.82	250	3.3	15	1.07
SMTS-SYTS 1	50	0.2	1	33.6	1,000	6.0	42	1.8
SMTS-SYTS 2	100	1.2	6	2.3	100	1.2	6	2.3
SYTS-MLTS 1	100	4.3	21	1.33	100	4.3	21	1.33
SYTS-MLTS 2	100	4.4	21	1.29	100	4.4	21	1.29
BATS-BETS	200	0.4	1	5.5	250	1.3	6	1.9
BETS-KGTS	50	0.7	2	8.8	50	0.7	2	8.8
TOTAL		**13.1**	**60**			**31.3**	**166**	

The initial resilience proposal only included 164 transmission towers as the BETS-KGTS 220kV transmission line has been removed from the initial resilience program because it overlaps with the Victorian Transmission Plan.

3.2.2.2. Inclusion of unjustified and inefficient risk allowances

AusNet has included risk allowances in its capex that had not been sufficiently justified and do not represent efficient costs. The AER has removed risk allowances in its alternative forecasts.

[3] AER, AusNet Services transmission determination 2027-32 Draft Decision Attachment 2 – capital expenditure, June 2026, Appendix A.4, pg. 36 to 38, Draft decision | Australian Energy Regulator (AER)

[4] AER has incorrectly shown 25 towers on LYPS-HWTS 2 line instead of 28 towers

4. Revised network resilience program

AusNet has revised the network resilience program in response to the AER's Draft Decision and to incorporate safety risk considerations. The revised program addresses the AER's concerns regarding transmission line resilience, customer benefits and risk allowances, and supplements the initial economic assessment to identify the safety benefits of tower strengthening on the eight critical transmission lines included in the initial proposal.

The revised program distinguishes between:

- **transmission line resilience**, which is assessed at a line level because a line's resilience is limited by its weakest tower; and
- **tower safety risk**, which is assessed at a tower level because safety exposure depends on the location and consequence of individual tower collapse.

The revised scope has therefore been developed in two stages: an economically justified line-resilience scope, followed by additional tower-specific works identified through the safety assessment. This has informed the revised scope, justification and forecast volume for the program, as shown in Table 5.

The revised program comprises 164 towers justified through the line-level resilience assessment and nine additional towers identified through the tower-level safety assessment. Of the 52 towers identified through the safety assessment, 43 are already included in the resilience scope and are therefore not counted twice. The resulting revised scope is 173 towers across the same eight transmission lines.

Table 3 summarises the changes since the initial proposal.

Table 3: Summary of changes since the initial proposal

Measure	Initial proposal	Revised proposal		
		Revised resilience scope	Additional safety scope	Total revised scope
Number of transmission lines included in scope	Eight transmission lines, which excludes BETS-KGTS line due to overlap with Victorian Transmission Plan			
Selection basis	Highest line-resilience level with cumulative BCR above one	Highest line-resilience level with cumulative BCR above one	Tower selected based on risk reduction benefits (including safety risks) exceed annualised tower strengthening cost in the 2027-32 regulatory period	Combined resilience and safety scope with overlaps removed
Number of towers proposed to be strengthened	164	164	9 additional towers	173

4.1. Transmission line resilience

This section explains how AusNet has addressed the AER's key concerns on the network resilience program as set out in section 3.2.2. It demonstrates the proposed transmission line resilience is justified by considering only wholesale market benefits.

4.1.1. AusNet's network resilience program meets AER's definition of network resilience expenditure

The AER defines network resilience as the ability of a network and its supporting systems to continue to adequately provide network services and recover those services when subjected to disruptive events[5] (i.e. ability to withstand and recover from an extreme hazard event)[6]. While the AER recognises there is a close relationship between resilience and reliability. It distinguishes resilience related expenditure based on whether the primary driver or need for the expenditure is to address outages of more than 12 hours from extreme weather events.[7]

AusNet's network resilience program meets this definition. The program is designed to improve the resilience of transmission lines to extreme winds that could cause tower collapse and prolonged transmission outages, particularly those market critical transmission lines. Recent tower collapse events at Cressy and Anakie resulted in extended outages, and single circuit line tower collapse events can typically take up to two weeks to restore.

4.1.2. Network resilience needs to be considered on a per line basis

A transmission line is vulnerable to outage if any tower on that line cannot withstand the relevant extreme wind event. Strengthening only one or a small number of towers may reduce individual tower risk, but it will not make the line resilient if other towers on the same line remain below the target resilience level.

AusNet has, therefore, assessed resilience on a transmission line basis. This reflects the practical reality that line resilience is limited by the weakest tower on the line.

This concept of assessing network resilience programs on a line basis has also been used in Powercor's resilience proposals for its 2026-31 regulatory period. These network resilience programs have been included in AER's decision for Powercor 2026-31 regulatory period.

4.1.3. ARI has been used as a proxy for downdrafts

The tower collapses at Cressy and Anakie were caused by convective downdrafts, which are sudden short bursts of cold air that plunge to the ground and fan out horizontally in all directions. There is currently no Australian or international standard that specifies a recurrence interval for downdraft wind events.

The Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) is the long-term average number of years between occurrences of a weather event that reaches or exceeds a certain magnitude. For example, a 100 year ARI event is expected to occur on average once every 100 years.

AusNet has, therefore, used Average Recurrence Interval (ARI) as a proxy for the likelihood of extreme wind events. ARI reflects regional synoptic wind speeds and may understate the localised intensity of downdrafts. This is an important consideration when assessing whether lower levels of strengthening would provide sufficient resilience benefit.

4.1.4. 1,000 ARI tower strength has been prudently selected

AusNet's legacy towers were built to the standards applicable at the time. New towers in Victoria are designed to withstand a minimum 400 ARI wind event under AS/NZS 7000 overhead line design.

The wind speeds experienced during the Anakie and Cressy tower collapse events exceeded the current AS/NZS7000 standard design requirements. AusNet has, therefore, selected 1,000 ARI tower strengthening as a prudent intervention level for towers included in the program and is consistent with AusNet's safety obligations – i.e., under the *Electricity Safety Act 1998 (Vic)*, AusNet's General Duty to minimise safety risk to as far as practicable requires AusNet to apply any known information about safety hazards (referred to as 'state of knowledge about safety hazard'). This is higher than the current minimum design standard, but remains below the estimated wind speeds experienced during the most severe recent tower collapse events. Strengthening all towers to withstand those extreme wind speeds would not be economic.

4.1.5. Line resilience depends on all towers on the line

Strengthening a tower to 1,000 ARI is different from making a transmission line resilient to 1,000 ARI. A transmission line is only resilient to 1,000 ARI if all its towers are designed to withstand that ARI.

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[5] AER, Network Resilience Guidelines Consultation Paper, June 2026, pg. 12, Network resilience guidelines | Australian Energy Regulator (AER)
[6] AER, Value of Network Resilience Final Decision, September 2024, pg. 1, Value of Network Resilience 2024 | Australian Energy Regulator (AER)
[7] AER, Network Resilience Guidelines Consultation Paper, June 2026, pg. 13, Network resilience guidelines | Australian Energy Regulator (AER)

AusNet's approach is, therefore, to strengthen the relevant towers on each critical line to achieve the highest line resilience level that is economically justified.

4.1.6. Benefit has been based on market impact

The AER's Value of Network Resilience (VNR) is not suitable for transmission network service providers because transmission businesses do not have direct residential and business customers.

AusNet has, therefore, calculated resilience benefits based on the electricity market impact avoided by reducing the likelihood of transmission line outage caused by tower collapse.

4.1.7. BCR has been used to select target transmission line resilience

As there is currently no Australian or international standard stipulating minimum resilience requirement for a transmission line, AusNet has assessed the BCR of increasing the resilience of market critical transmission lines to various ARI levels ranging from 25 to 1,000 ARI. This has informed the selected target resilience ARI level for each transmission line.

This BCR analysis is explained using LYPS-HWTS 3 as an example. Table 4 shows the cumulative number of towers requiring strengthening for each ARI and the associated BCR to strengthen the towers to 1,000 ARI.

- For the 100 ARI shown in Table 4

  There are currently five towers on the LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line that will not withstand a 100 ARI. The BCR to strengthen these five towers to 1,000 ARI is 1.82. After strengthening these five towers, the entire LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line will be able to withstand up to 100 ARI.

- For the 200 ARI shown in Table 4

  There are currently eight towers on the LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line that will not withstand a wind speed between 100 and 200 ARI. This means a cumulative total of 13 towers will not withstand a wind speed up to 200 ARI. The BCR to strengthen the 13 towers to 1,000 ARI is 1.13. After strengthening these 13 towers, the entire LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line will be able to withstand up to 200 ARI.

- For the 250 ARI shown in Table 4

  There are currently two towers on the LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line that will not withstand a wind speed between 200 and 250 ARI and a cumulative total of 15 towers that will not withstand a wind speed up to 250 ARI. The BCR to strengthen the 15 towers to 1,000 ARI is 1.07. After strengthening these 15 towers, the entire LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line will be able to withstand up to 250 ARI.

Table 4: LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line resilience benefit cost assessment[8]

Description	ARI (years)						
	25	50	100	200	250	500	1,000
Cumulative number of towers unable to withstand the ARI (i.e. towers requiring strengthening)	-	-	5	13	15	22	28
BCR to strengthen the towers to 1,000 ARI	-	-	1.82	1.13	1.07	0.92	0.82

AusNet has selected to make the entire LYPS-HWTS 3 transmission line resilient to a 250 ARI because this is the highest assessed option for which the cumulative benefits of strengthening continue to exceed the cumulative costs. Although the 100 ARI option produces the highest BCR, stopping at that option would leave further positive net benefits unrealised. The 250 ARI option therefore captures all economically justified resilience benefits for this line.

4.1.8. AusNet proposes to prudently strengthen to the highest ARI that is economically viable

AusNet recognises that strengthening all transmission lines to withstand the most extreme wind conditions would not be economic. The revised program, therefore, focuses on the eight market critical lines and for each line, selects the highest assessed resilience level for which the cumulative BCR remains above one.

This approach differs from selecting the option that maximises the BCR. Maximising the BCR ratio identifies the most efficient individual option but does not necessarily maximise total net benefits. AusNet's approach continues

[8] Extracted from Table 5-21 on page 22 of Beca TRR 2027-32 Tower Resilience Study report submitted with the initial proposal

strengthening while cumulative benefits exceed cumulative costs, thereby capturing additional positive net benefits for customers. AusNet's approach is prudent because it:

- assesses resilience at the transmission line level
- reflects greater understanding of transmission line resilience against downdrafts
- recognises that ARI may under-represent downdrafts intensity
- captures additional resilience benefits while the cumulative benefits of the selected line-level scope continue to exceed cumulative costs
- balances customer benefits, cost and the risk of high impact low probability tower collapse events.

4.1.9. Risk allowances

AusNet has addressed the AER's concern on risk allowance by providing a more detailed bottom-up build for tower strengthening works. The revised cost build does not include risk allowances and is supported by the AusNet - Appendix 3A Unit Rates document.

4.2. Tower safety

This section outlines how AusNet has incorporated a risk assessment to minimise safety risk to as far as practicable levels into the revised resilience program.

The AER noted in its draft decision[9] that AusNet's initial resilience program only included market benefits and did not include safety risks. AusNet has reviewed the eight market critical lines to identify the safety benefits of tower strengthening. This is consistent with AusNet's safety obligations under the *Electricity Safety Act 1998 (Vic)* and reflects AusNet's current state of knowledge on the safety risks and risk mitigation measures.

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The safety assessment is separate from the line-level resilience assessment. Safety benefits have not been included in the BCR used to justify the 164 tower resilience scope. Instead, the safety assessment independently considers tower-specific consequences and the practicability of further risk reduction. It identifies 52 towers requiring treatment, of which 43 are already included in the resilience scope. The revised proposal therefore adds only the remaining nine towers, avoiding duplication of scope, cost and benefits.

4.2.1. Safety risk is assessed on a tower basis

Unlike line resilience, safety risk is location-specific and must be assessed at a tower level. The safety consequence of a tower collapse depends on the likelihood of people being present near the tower and the potential consequence of injury or fatality.

AusNet's tower-level assessment identified elevated safety risk on three of the eight critical transmission lines: SMTS-SYTS 1, SYTS-MLTS 1 and SYTS-MLTS 2. These lines include towers that cross freeway or highway roads, or are located in highly urbanised easements.

The assessment identified 52 towers requiring treatment to reduce safety risk as far as practicable.

4.2.2. Other consequences included in the economic assessment

In addition to public safety risks, AusNet has considered bushfire, collateral damage, market impact and financial consequence risks of each tower in the economic assessment.

These risks include:

- the risk of a tower failure starting a bushfire;
- damage to surrounding property, houses or vehicles;

[9] AER, AusNet Services transmission determination 2027-32 Draft Decision Attachment 2 – capital expenditure, June 2026, Appendix A.4.2, pg. 36, Draft decision | Australian Energy Regulator (AER)

- unplanned asset replacement and emergency response costs; and
- market impacts from transmission line outages.

Further details are provided in economic model 4.4.05 AusNet – Tower Resilience Economic Model and 4.4.09 AusNet – AMS 01-09 Asset Risk Assessment Overview.

4.2.3. Tower strengthening cost

For the additional safety-driven towers, the cost has been estimated using the average cost to strengthen comparable towers on the same lines from 100 ARI to 1,000 ARI.

4.3. AusNet's revised volume forecast

The revised forecast combines the line resilience-driven scope and the additional safety-driven towers, while removing overlap towers to avoid double counting.

The tower-level safety assessment identified 52 towers requiring treatment. Of these, 43 towers are already included in the line resilience scope. The remaining nine towers — four on SYTS-MLTS 1 and five on SYTS-MLTS 2 — have been added to the revised program.

As a result, AusNet's revised forecast increases the proposed tower strengthening volume from 164 towers in the initial proposal to 173 towers, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Network resilience initial and revised strengthening volumes

Transmission line	Line resilience driven		Tower safety driven	
	Initial volume (number)	Revised volume (number)	Initial volume (number)	Revised volume (number)
LYPS-HWTS 1	25	25	0	0
LYPS-HWTS 2	28	28	0	0
LYPS-HWTS 3	15	15	0	0
SMTS-SYTS 1	42	42	0	0
SMTS-SYTS 2	6	6	0	0
SYTS-MLTS 1	21	21	0	4
SYTS-MLTS 2	21	21	0	5
BATS-BETS	6	6	0	0
Total	**164**	**164**	**0**	**9**

5. Resource References

NO.	DOCUMENT TITLE
1	Electricity Safety Act 1998
2	National Electricity Rule
3	AER AusNet Services transmission determination 2027-32 Draft Decision Attachment 2 – capital expenditure, June 2026
4	AER Network Resilience Guidelines Consultation Paper, June 2026
5	AER Value of Network Resilience Final Decision, September 2024
6	AS/NZS 7000: Overhead line design
7	AMS 10-77 Transmission Line Structures
8	TRR 2027-32 Tower Resilience Study
9	AusNet - Appendix 3A Unit Rates – 1 Sep 2026
10	4.4.05 AusNet – Tower Resilience Economic Model – 1 Sep 2026
11	4.4.09 AusNet - AMS 01-09 Asset Risk Assessment Overview – 1 Sep 2026
12	4.4.10 AusNet - AMS 01-09-02 Event Trees – 1 Sep 2026

6. Schedule of Revisions

ISSUE NUMBER	DATE	DESCRIPTION	AUTHOR	APPROVED BY
1	28 August 2026	TRR 2027-32 Revised Proposal	[C-I-C]	[C-I-C]

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