

**Draft decision**

**Endeavour Energy distribution determination**

**2015–16 to 2018–19**

**Attachment 11: Service target performance incentive scheme**

November 2014

© Commonwealth of Australia 2014

1. This work is copyright. In addition to any use permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, all material contained within this work is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia licence, with the exception of:

* the Commonwealth Coat of Arms
* the ACCC and AER logos
* any illustration, diagram, photograph or graphic over which the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission does not hold copyright, but which may be part of or contained within this publication.

1. The details of the relevant licence conditions are available on the Creative Commons website, as is the full legal code for the CC BY 3.0 AU licence.
2. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the Director, Corporate Communications, ACCC, GPO Box 3131, Canberra ACT 2601, or
3. [publishing.unit@accc.gov.au](mailto:publishing.unit@accc.gov.au) .
4. Inquiries about this document should be addressed to:

Australian Energy Regulator

GPO Box 520

Melbourne Vic 3001

Tel: (03) 9290 1444

Fax: (03) 9290 1457

Email: [AERInquiry@aer.gov.au](mailto:AERInquiry@aer.gov.au)

AER reference: 54420

1. Note

This attachment forms part of the AER's draft decision on Endeavour Energy's 2015–19 distribution determination. It should be read with other parts of the draft decision.

The draft decision includes the following documents:

Overview

Attachment 1 – Annual revenue requirement

Attachment 2 – Regulatory asset base

Attachment 3 – Rate of return

Attachment 4 – Value of imputation credits

Attachment 5 – Regulatory depreciation

Attachment 6 – Capital expenditure

Attachment 7 – Operating expenditure

Attachment 8 – Corporate income tax

Attachment 9 – Efficiency benefit sharing scheme

Attachment 10 – Capital expenditure sharing scheme

Attachment 11 – Service target performance incentive scheme

Attachment 12 – Demand management incentive scheme

Attachment 13 – Classification of services

Attachment 14 – Control mechanisms

Attachment 15 – Pass through events

Attachment 16 – Alternative control services

Attachment 17 – Negotiated services framework and criteria

Attachment 18 – Connection policy

1. Contents

[Note 11-3](#_Toc404264869)

[Contents 11-4](#_Toc404264870)

[Shortened forms 11-5](#_Toc404264871)

[11 Service target performance incentive scheme 11-7](#_Toc404264872)

[11.1 Draft decision 11-7](#_Toc404264873)

[11.1.1 Revenue at risk 11-7](#_Toc404264874)

[11.1.2 Performance targets 11-8](#_Toc404264875)

[11.1.3 Incentive rates 11-9](#_Toc404264876)

[11.2 Endeavour Energy's proposal 11-9](#_Toc404264877)

[11.3 AER's assessment approach 11-11](#_Toc404264878)

[11.3.1 Interrelationships 11-12](#_Toc404264879)

[11.4 Reasons for draft decision 11-12](#_Toc404264880)

[11.4.1 Applicable components and parameters 11-12](#_Toc404264881)

[11.4.2 Revenue at risk 11-13](#_Toc404264882)

[11.4.3 Reliability of supply component 11-14](#_Toc404264883)

[11.4.4 Customer service component 11-26](#_Toc404264884)

1. Shortened forms

| 1. Shortened form | 1. Extended form |
| --- | --- |
| 1. AARR | 1. aggregate annual revenue requirement |
| 1. AEMC | 1. Australian Energy Market Commission |
| 1. AEMO | 1. Australian Energy Market Operator |
| 1. AER | 1. Australian Energy Regulator |
| 1. ASRR | 1. aggregate service revenue requirement |
| 1. augex | 1. augmentation expenditure |
| 1. capex | 1. capital expenditure |
| 1. CCP | 1. Consumer Challenge Panel |
| 1. CESS | 1. capital expenditure sharing scheme |
| 1. CPI | 1. consumer price index |
| 1. CPI-X | 1. consumer price index minus X |
| 1. DRP | 1. debt risk premium |
| 1. DMIA | 1. demand management innovation allowance |
| 1. DMIS | 1. demand management incentive scheme |
| 1. distributor | 1. distribution network service provider |
| 1. DUoS | 1. distribution use of system |
| 1. EBSS | 1. efficiency benefit sharing scheme |
| 1. ERP | 1. equity risk premium |
| 1. expenditure assessment guideline | 1. expenditure forecast assessment guideline for electricity distribution |
| 1. F&A | 1. framework and approach |
| 1. MRP | 1. market risk premium |
| 1. NEL | 1. national electricity law |
| 1. NEM | 1. national electricity market |
| 1. NEO | 1. national electricity objective |
| 1. NER | 1. national electricity rules |
| 1. NSP | 1. network service provider |
| 1. opex | 1. operating expenditure |
| 1. PPI | 1. partial performance indicators |
| 1. PTRM | 1. post-tax revenue model |
| 1. RAB | 1. regulatory asset base |
| 1. RBA | 1. Reserve Bank of Australia |
| 1. repex | 1. replacement expenditure |
| 1. RFM | 1. roll forward model |
| 1. RIN | 1. regulatory information notice |
| 1. RPP | 1. revenue pricing principles |
| 1. SAIDI | 1. system average interruption duration index |
| 1. SAIFI | 1. system average interruption frequency index |
| 1. SLCAPM | 1. Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model |
| 1. STPIS | 1. service target performance incentive scheme |
| 1. WACC | 1. weighted average cost of capital |

# Service target performance incentive scheme

We published the current version of our national Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme for electricity DNSPs (STPIS) in November 2009. This scheme provides a financial incentive for DNSPs to maintain and improve their performance.[[1]](#footnote-1) The STPIS balances the incentive in the regulatory framework for DNSPs to reduce costs at the expense of service performance. Cost reductions are beneficial to both DNSPs and their customers when service performance is maintained or improved.

The STPIS establishes targets based on historical performance, and provides financial rewards for DNSPs exceeding performance targets and financial penalties for DNSPs failing to meet targets. These rewards and penalties are calculated by taking into account the value of customer reliability (VCR). This aligns the DNSPs' incentives with the long term interests of consumer, which is consistent with the NEO.

The STPIS has two components, the s-factor component and the guaranteed service levels (GSL) scheme. The s-factor component adjusts the revenue that a DNSP earns depending on reliability of supply and customer service performance. The GSL scheme sets threshold levels of service for DNSPs to achieve and requires direct payment to customers who experience service worse than the predetermined level.

1. We have not previously applied our national STPIS to the NSW or ACT DNSPs and we determined that no STPIS would apply to the NSW or ACT DNSPs in the transitional regulatory control period.[[2]](#footnote-2) That is, the NSW and ACT DNSPs are not currently subject to financial penalty or reward through the s-factor component. However, jurisdictional GSL arrangements do apply.
2. In our stage 2 framework and approach paper, we proposed to apply the s-factor component of our national STPIS to the NSW and ACT DNSPs for the 2015–19 regulatory control period. We considered this to be suitable given we now have sufficient historical data (collected over the 2009–14 regulatory control period) with which to set service performance targets. We did not propose to apply the guaranteed service level component (GSL) if the NSW and ACT DNSPs remain subject to jurisdictional GSL arrangements.[[3]](#footnote-3)

## Draft decision

1. Consistent with our stage 2 framework and approach paper and Endeavour Energy's proposal, we will apply the s-factor component of our national STPIS to Endeavour Energy for the 2015–19 regulatory control period. We will not apply the GSL component to Endeavour Energy as the existing NSW GSL arrangement will continue to apply. We propose to apply the STPIS to Endeavour Energy in accordance with the details set out below.

### Revenue at risk

1. The revenue at risk caps the risk of the STPIS to Endeavour Energy. The penalty or reward of the STPIS is calculated as a percentage adjustment to Endeavour Energy's total revenue. We accept Endeavour Energy's proposal that the revenue at risk for each regulatory year of the 2015–19 regulatory control period will be capped at ±2.5 per cent. Within this there will be a cap of ±2.25 per cent for the reliability of supply component and ±0.25 per cent for the customer service component.[[4]](#footnote-4)

### Performance targets

Reliability of supply

1. We will apply the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) and System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI) of the reliability of supply component to Endeavour Energy. We accept Endeavour Energy's proposed Box-Cox transformation to derive the major event day thresholds (MED) as it is a suitable method for creating a normal distribution. However, we do not accept Endeavour Energy's proposed performance targets based on the average performance over past 5 regulatory years as it has not accounted for its past reliability improvement expenditure as required by clause 3.2.1(a) of the STPIS.
2. As we have not observed any overall reliability improvement trend from Endeavour Energy's performance over the last five regulatory years, we have adjusted Endeavour Energy's performance targets based on the apportioned adjustments for Ausgrid. This is because Endeavour Energy has reported it has spent $660 million of reliability related expenditure in the last five regulatory years. We expect Endeavour Energy would broadly achieve similar levels of Ausgrid's SAIDI and SAIFI improvement, after taking into account their relative past investments and sizes. Table 11‑1 sets out our draft decision on Endeavour Energy's performance targets for reliability of supply component.

Table 11‑1 Our indicative performance targets for Endeavour Energy's reliability of supply component[[5]](#footnote-5)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Year | 1. 2015/16 | 1. 2016/17 | 1. 2017/18 | 1. 2018/19 |
| 1. Unplanned SAIDI |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Urban | 1. 58.40 | 1. 58.40 | 1. 58.40 | 1. 58.40 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 178.30 | 1. 178.30 | 1. 178.30 | 1. 178.30 |
| 1. Unplanned SAIFI |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Urban | 1. 0.737 | 1. 0.737 | 1. 0.737 | 1. 0.737 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 1.679 | 1. 1.679 | 1. 1.679 | 1. 1.679 |

Source: AER analysis.

Customer service component

We will apply the telephone answering parameter to Endeavour Energy. We accept Endeavour Energy's proposed performance target that 75 per cent of calls will be answered within 30 seconds.

### Incentive rates

1. The incentive rates represent the penalties or rewards that Endeavour Energy will receive for each unit of variation in performance from the relevant performance target. Instead of applying the VCR prescribed in clause 3.2.2 of the STPIS, we consider the most recent VCR should be applied as it better reflects customers' current value for reliability.
2. We note that AEMO has recently carried out a VCR review and has published the final results from this review in September 2014.[[6]](#footnote-6) We consider the revised AEMO VCR values represent the best available information for this purpose because the review process was comprehensive and included survey of NSW consumers and relies on more recent information on the preferences of NSW consumers than the VCRs prescribed in the STPIS. Table 11‑2 presents our indicative incentive rates to apply to Endeavour Energy's SAIDI and SAIFI targets. They are based on the 2014 AEMO NSW VCR and the average of the smoothed annual revenue determined in this draft decision.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Table 11‑2 Our indicative incentive rates on Endeavour Energy's reliability of supply targets

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Network type | 1. Urban | 1. Short rural |
| 1. Unplanned SAIDI | 0.06188 | 0.00981 |
| 1. Unplanned SAIFI | 5.05537 | 1.13215 |

Source: AER analysis.

1. Broadly these VCRs stemming from the recent AEMO work are lower than the previous VCRs reflecting a lower customer willingness to pay for reliability improvements. This leads to lower incentive rates and smaller penalties and rewards for each unit of variation in performance from the targets set.
2. The incentive rate for the telephone answering parameter will be -0.04 per cent per unit, which is consistent with Endeavour Energy's proposal and clause 5.3.2 of the STPIS.[[8]](#footnote-8)

## Endeavour Energy's proposal

1. Endeavour Energy broadly accepted our proposed application of the STPIS for the 2015–19 regulatory control period. It proposed that only unplanned SAIDI and unplanned SAIFI of the reliability of supply component would be subject to revenue at risk as it is not able to reliably measure MAIFI for the purposes of revenue incentives.[[9]](#footnote-9) It also proposed to apply the telephone answering parameter under the customer service component.[[10]](#footnote-10)
2. Endeavour Energy proposed a revenue at risk of ±2.5 per cent, which comprised of ±2.25 per cent for reliability of supply parameters and ± 0.25 per cent for the telephone answering parameter.[[11]](#footnote-11)
3. For the reliability of supply component, Endeavour Energy proposed to derive the MED thresholds using the Box-Cox transformation as it considered its performance data transformed through the logarithm transformation set out in the scheme is not satisfactorily normally distributed. It proposed to set its performance targets based on the average performance over the last 5 complete years without adjusting for completed reliability improvements. Table 11‑3 below sets out Endeavour Energy's proposed performance targets for unplanned SAIDI and unplanned SAIFI. It also proposed to calculate the incentive rates in accordance with clause 3.2.2 of the STPIS and use the VCR prescribed in the STPIS.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Table 11‑3 Endeavour Energy's proposed performance targets for the reliability of supply component

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Year | 1. 2014/15 | 1. 2015/16 | 1. 2016/17 | 1. 2017/18 | 1. 2018/19 |
| 1. Unplanned SAIDI (minutes) |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Urban | 1. 63.4 | 1. 63.4 | 1. 63.4 | 1. 63.4 | 1. 63.4 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 206.0 | 1. 206.0 | 1. 206.0 | 1. 206.0 | 1. 206.0 |
| 1. Unplanned SAIFI |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Urban | 1. 0.825 | 1. 0.825 | 1. 0.825 | 1. 0.825 | 1. 0.825 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 1.945 | 1. 1.945 | 1. 1.945 | 1. 1.945 | 1. 1.945 |

Source: Endeavour Energy, Attachment 3.2 – proposed application of STPIS, May 2014, p.7.

1. For the customer service component, Endeavour Energy proposed to exclude reliability of supply exclusions from the calculation of telephone answering performance, consistent with clause 3.3 of the STPIS. It submitted that its historical performance does not reflect its current performance as scale efficiencies cannot be achieved due to its retail separation as part of the Transitional Service Agreement (TSA). Prior to retail separation in February 2013, Endeavour Energy's call centre had significantly more staff to take both retail and network related calls. Endeavour Energy proposed to set the telephone answering target at 75 per cent based on the historical performance for the post retail separation period (from February 2013). It also proposed to apply the incentive rate of -0.04 per cent per unit of the telephone answering parameter consistent with clause 5.3.2(a)(1) of the STPIS.[[13]](#footnote-13)

## AER's assessment approach

In developing and implementing the STPIS, we must take into account:

* + - * 1. the need to ensure that benefits to electricity consumers likely to result from the scheme are sufficient to warrant any reward or penalty under the scheme for Distribution Network Service Providers; and
        2. any regulatory obligation or requirement to which the Distribution Network Service Provider is subject; and
        3. the past performance of the distribution network; and
        4. any other incentives available to the Distribution Network Service Provider under the Rules or a relevant distribution determination; and
        5. the need to ensure that the incentives are sufficient to offset any financial incentives the Distribution Network Service Provider may have to reduce costs at the expense of service levels; and
        6. the willingness of the customer or end user to pay for improved performance in the delivery of services; and
        7. the possible effects of the scheme on incentives for the implementation of non-network alternatives.

Clause 2.1(d) of the STPIS requires us to determine the following in accordance with the NER and the implementation of the STPIS:

* + - * 1. each applicable component and parameter to apply to a DNSP including the method of network segmentation for the reliability of supply component
        2. the revenue at risk to apply to each applicable component and parameter
        3. the incentive rate to apply to each applicable parameter including the value of customer reliability (VCR) to be applied in accordance with clause 3.2.2(d) and appendix B
        4. the performance target to apply to each applicable parameter in each regulatory year of the regulatory control period
        5. any decision with respect to the transitional arrangements set out in clause 2.6
        6. the threshold to apply to each applicable GSL parameter
        7. the payment amount to apply to the applicable GSL parameter
        8. the major event day boundary to apply to a DNSP:

where the DNSP has proposed a major event day boundary that is greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean; or

where the major event day boundary that applied to the DNSP in previous distribution determinations was greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean; or

where the DNSP has proposed a major event day boundary that is greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean and where in previous distribution determinations the major event day boundary that has applied to the DNSP was greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the mean.

1. We have outlined our likely approach to the application of the STPIS in the stage 2 framework and approach paper. We have adopted the position in the framework and approach paper, unless new information has become available which warrants a reconsideration of this position. In such instance, we have considered the relative merits of the alternative against the objectives of the STPIS.

### Interrelationships

1. In applying the STPIS we must consider any other incentives available to the distributor under the rules or relevant distribution determination.[[14]](#footnote-14) One of the objectives of the STPIS is to ensure that the incentives are sufficient to offset any financial incentives the service provider may have to reduce costs at the expense of service levels.[[15]](#footnote-15) For the 2015–19 regulatory control period, the STPIS will interact with the Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme (CESS). However, for this period we will not apply the expenditure benefit sharing scheme (EBSS) which applies to opex as we have set the opex allowance exogenously.[[16]](#footnote-16)
2. The CESS rewards distributors whose capital expenditure becomes more efficient. In setting the STPIS performance targets, we will consider both completed and planned reliability improvements expected to materially affect network reliability performance.[[17]](#footnote-17) By setting the performance targets in such a way, any incentive a DNSP may have to reduce the capital expenditure at the expense of target service levels will be offset by the STPIS penalty.
3. We have not funded Endeavour Energy with capex or opex allowances to improve its supply reliability for the 2015–19 regulatory control period. Therefore if Endeavour Energy were to improve its reliability, it should fund the investment itself, which it could do from STPIS rewards. This means it will only earn a financial reward from the STPIS after the investment has delivered a material improvement to the reliability outcomes. Our proposed incentive rates will ensure that this financial reward is reflective of customers' value on reliability improvement. The STPIS will ensure that any investment decision to improve reliability will be made efficiently after taking into account the VCR. This leads to more efficient investment outcomes that meet the long term interest of consumers.

## Reasons for draft decision

1. The following section sets out our consideration in applying the STPIS to Endeavour Energy for the 2015–19 regulatory control period.

### Applicable components and parameters

1. We have stated in stage 2 framework and approach paper that:[[18]](#footnote-18)

* performance targets would be set for both SAIDI and SAIFI under the reliability of supply component, with financial incentives attached to each.
* NSW DNSPs' network would be divided into four feeder types (CBD, urban, short rural and long rural).
* we will apply the telephone answering parameter under the customer service component to the NSW DNSPs in the 2015–19 regulatory control period.
* we would not apply the GSL component of the STPIS to NSW DNSPs while the jurisdictional GSL scheme remains in place.

1. As we have not identified any reasons that we should depart from the above positions, we will apply the SAIDI and SAIFI reliability of supply parameters and the telephone answering customer service parameter to Endeavour Energy. We will not apply the GSL component of the STPIS to Endeavour Energy in the 2015–19 regulatory control period as the existing NSW GSL arrangement will continue to apply.
2. The CCP suggested that we should consider the inclusion of a public lighting element into the STPIS as it would provide DNSPs with incentives to respond appropriately to the needs of consumers, until there is more contestability.[[19]](#footnote-19) Origin suggested that we should consider broadening the scope of the STPIS to include measures reflecting services that customers value more, this includes timeframe required to visit a customer's premise and re-billing caused by metering errors.[[20]](#footnote-20) We consider these issues would be better addressed when we review our national STPIS. Given there is inadequate time to review our national STPIS to consider these issues before finalising our determinations for the NSW DNSPs, we will not apply those suggested additional components to Endeavour Energy.

### Revenue at risk

1. Revenue at risk caps the potential rewards and penalties that Endeavour Energy would receive under the scheme. The STPIS allows us to vary the revenue at risk where this would satisfy the objectives of the scheme. In setting the revenue at risk, we must take into account the benefits to consumers that are likely to result from the scheme, in particular, that the benefits are sufficient to warrant any reward or penalty under the scheme for the DNSPs.
2. We proposed to set the revenue at risk for the NSW DNSPs within the range of ± 5 per cent in the stage 2 framework and approach paper. In Endeavour Energy's regulatory proposal, it considered the ±5 per cent revenue at risk to be excessive given the implementation issues with transitioning to a new scheme.[[21]](#footnote-21) Endeavour Energy proposed to apply a revenue at risk of ±2.5 per cent. Within this there will be a cap of ±2.25 per cent for the reliability of supply component and ±0.25 per cent for the customer service component.[[22]](#footnote-22)
3. Through its customer research, Endeavour Energy found that customers are reluctant to pay more for reliability improvement.[[23]](#footnote-23) The CCP further suggested that consumers may prefer lower prices for reduced reliability.[[24]](#footnote-24) Under this circumstance, we consider that applying a lower revenue at risk would better meet the objectives of the scheme and the long term interest of consumers as it limits customers' exposure to potential price increases if there is further reliability improvement. Further, as discussed in section 11.4.3, Endeavour Energy has spent a total of $660 million on reliability and security improvement projects. There is uncertainty as to what this expenditure would deliver in terms of improved supply reliability in the 2015–19 regulatory control period. We have adjusted Endeavour Energy's performance targets for completed reliability improvement projects that are expected to result in a material improvement in supply reliability. This intended to mitigate the risks of customers paying twice for service improvements that they have already paid. Further, the application of a lower powered scheme (reflecting the lower value on customer reliability) in this instance will reduce the risk of consumers and Endeavour Energy for paying or receiving inadequate rewards or penalties under the adjusted performance targets.
4. We accept Endeavour Energy's proposal that the revenue at risk for each regulatory year of the 2015–19 regulatory control period will be capped at ±2.5 per cent. Within this there will be a cap of ±2.25 per cent for the reliability of supply component and ±0.25 per cent for the customer service component. We consider this lower powered incentive would balance the risk to both consumers and Endeavour Energy and thus better meet the objectives of the STPIS.

### Reliability of supply component

We will apply unplanned SAIDI and unplanned SAIFI parameters under the reliability of supply component to Endeavour Energy for the 2015–19 regulatory control period. Unplanned SAIDI measures the sum of the duration of each unplanned sustained customer interruption (in minutes) divided by the total number of distribution customers. Unplanned SAIFI measures the total number of unplanned sustained customer interruptions divided by the total number of distribution customers.

MED exclusions

1. The STPIS allows certain events to be excluded from the calculation of the s-factor revenue adjustment. These exclusions include the events that are beyond the control of Endeavour Energy, such as the effects of transmission network outages and other upstream events. They also exclude the effects of extreme weather events that have the potential to significantly affect Endeavour Energy's STPIS performance.
2. Endeavour Energy proposed to derive the MED thresholds using the Box-Cox transformation as it considered its performance data transformed through the logarithm transformation is not satisfactorily normally distributed.[[25]](#footnote-25) Appendix D of the STPIS provides that where a statistical test of the data is not normally distributed, the DNSP may propose an alternative data transformation method which results in a more normally distributed data set.
3. We consider Endeavour Energy's proposed Box-Cox transformation provides a more normally distributed data set compared to the logarithm transformation under the 2.5 beta method. We therefore accept this proposed alternative statistical technique. We also note that we have previously accepted Box-Cox transformation for the 2010 ETSA Utilities determination.[[26]](#footnote-26) We will apply the exclusions as proposed by Endeavour Energy and have incorporated our calculation of exclusions into the setting of STPIS targets for this draft decision. Table 11‑4 sets out our calculated MED thresholds calculated using Box-Cox transformation.

Table 11‑4 Our calculated MED thresholds (TMED) using Box-Cox transformation

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Regulatory year | TMED |
| 2009/10 | 4.763 |
| 2010/11 | 3.856 |
| 2011/12 | 3.687 |
| 2012/13 | 3.375 |
| 2013/14 | 3.117 |

Source: AER analysis

1. Based on our calculated MED thresholds above, we identified 10 major event days that should be excluded from the historical 2009–13 period for setting the unplanned SAIDI and SAIFI performance targets, they are set out in Table 11‑5 below. We note that Endeavour Energy only identified three major event days (5 September 2010, 5 July 2011 and 24 February 2013) in its reported sustained interruptions data for the same period. We have corrected the 2009/10–2012/13 historical data for this difference and have based our proposed performance targets on the revised historical data as set out in Table 11‑5.

Table 11‑5 Our identified historical major event days for Endeavour Energy

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Date | Network SAIDI (after removing excluded events) |
| 1/08/2008 | 14.2018 |
| 5/09/2010 | 63.4365 |
| 16/12/2010 | 4.9160 |
| 5/07/2011 | 73.0888 |
| 25/05/2012 | 4.2655 |
| 5/06/2012 | 4.2931 |
| 23/08/2012 | 4.1194 |
| 12/10/2012 | 3.9292 |
| 23/02/2013 | 4.7965 |
| 24/02/2013 | 11.4418 |
| 1/03/2013 | 3.6643 |

Source: AER analysis

Table 11‑6 Our revised historical unplanned SAIDI and SAIFI for the 2009–13 period

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Year | 1. 2009/10 | 1. 2010/11 | 1. 2011/12 | 1. 2012/13 |
| 1. Endeavour's reported unplanned SAIDI | | | | |
| 1. Urban | 1. 59.25 | 1. 54.46 | 1. 63.19 | 1. 75.49 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 157.32 | 1. 166.25 | 1. 240.42 | 1. 247.99 |
| 1. Endeavour Energy's reported unplanned SAIFI | | | | |
| 1. Urban | 1. 0.791 | 1. 0.722 | 1. 0.824 | 1. 0.955 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 1.683 | 1. 1.602 | 1. 1.937 | 1. 2.490 |
| 1. Our revised unplanned SAIDI after removing additional identified MEDs | | | | |
| 1. Urban | 1. 59.25 | 1. 52.54 | 1. 61.36 | 1. 65.20 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 157.32 | 1. 149.27 | 1. 198.90 | 1. 200.48 |
| 1. Our revised unplanned SAIFI after removing additional identified MEDs | | | | |
| 1. Urban | 1. 0.791 | 1. 0.693 | 1. 0.807 | 1. 0.881 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 1.683 | 1. 1.392 | 1. 1.819 | 1. 2.230 |

Source: AER analysis.

Performance targets

1. In the stage 2 framework and approach paper, we proposed to set the performance targets based on Endeavour Energy's average performance over the past five regulatory years. As we are setting the performance targets for 2015/16 regulatory year onwards, we consider the most recent data is desirable and it is also consistent with the STPIS. We will use our revised historical data for the 2009/10–2013/14 regulatory years as the base to forecast service performance.

The STPIS requires us to take into account any regulatory obligation or requirement to which Endeavour Energy is subject to. Endeavour Energy is required to meet the minimum network overall reliability standards prescribed in schedule 2 of the NSW licence conditions for electricity distributors.[[27]](#footnote-27) We note Endeavour Energy is currently performing better than these prescribed minimum requirement as illustrated in Figure 11‑1 and Figure 11‑2 . The NSW licence conditions indicate that the DNSP has discretion to plan its investment for compliance with these licence conditions to suit its individual circumstances if it is economically efficient to do so.[[28]](#footnote-28) Endeavour Energy proposed to set its performance targets based on average performance over the past five regulatory years, consistent with our proposed approach in the framework and approach paper.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Figure 11‑1 Endeavour Energy's unplanned SAIDI performance, proposed target and minimum standards for urban and short rural feeder types (minutes)



Source: Endeavour Energy, RIN table 6.2.1; AER analysis

Figure 11‑2 Endeavour Energy's unplanned SAIFI performance, proposed target and minimum standards for urban and short rural types (number of interruptions)

1. 

Source: Endeavour Energy, RIN table 6.2.2; AER analysis

1. Clause 3.2.1(a) of the STPIS states that performance targets for the reliability of supply parameters must be established with reference to average historical performance modified to account for completed or planned reliability improvements and any other factor expected to materially affect network reliability performance.
2. We do not have a preferred method for how this modification should be undertaken. However, such modification must take account of expenditure programs completed in the previous regulatory period or planned to be undertaken in the next regulatory control period, and the benefits, in terms of improved reliability outcomes, these programs are expected to deliver to the DNSP’s network. Any proposed modification will need to be supported by statistical analysis.
3. The EUAA noted the NSW Government has removed various planning standards and made its reliability standards more flexible. It suggested that the AER should ensure the DNSPs' proposals would reflect the recent changes to reliability standards.[[30]](#footnote-30) The key determinant of a DNSP's reliability performance is its existing network assets and their configuration, which is the result of the DNSP's historical investment and its operating practices. Most of these assets have an expected life in excess of 50 years, therefore by discounting for uncontrollable external impacts such as weather variations, the DNSP's reliability level should not change abruptly. Setting the performance targets based on historical average and adjusted for the results of completed and planned reliability improvement ensures customers do not pay for historical reliability investment twice.
4. We note a key driver of the NSW DNSPs' expenditure in the 2009–14 regulatory control period was to augment their networks to meet the previous N-1 deterministic planning standard.[[31]](#footnote-31) Endeavour Energy reported it has spent around $614 million of capex to meet this planning standard in the 2009–14 regulatory control period. It has also spent an additional $46 million of capex on the urban and short rural feeder types in the same period that would have a direct impact on reliability.[[32]](#footnote-32) That is, Endeavour Energy has spent a total of $660 million to improve security and reliability of its network during the 2009–14 regulatory control period. The NSW Government has removed this N-1 deterministic planning standard from the licence conditions since 1 July 2014.
5. Endeavour Energy submitted that N-1 investment has little impact on the expected reliability outcomes as it was made to ensure supply security for transformers which have an expected failure rate of 1 in 100 years. It also noted that its investment in improving poor performing feeders has not resulted in material overall network reliability improvement. As its reliability performance has been stable over the past regulatory period, it proposed to maintain that level of reliability performance[[33]](#footnote-33).
6. The STPIS scheme requires that the performance targets to apply during the regulatory control period must be based on average performance over the past five regulatory years. It also requires that these averages be modified by any completed reliability improvements that were proposed by the DNSP, and the cost of the improvements allowed by the relevant regulator, in the DNSP’s previous regulatory proposal or regulatory submission.[[34]](#footnote-34)
7. In our previous determination, we have set the capex allowance for Endeavour Energy to meet the N-1 standards. Such expenditure was funded by consumers and included in the Regulatory Asset Base. We consider that the consumers should not pay twice for reliability improvement—once through the Standard Control Service charges and again through the reward received from improvement to supply reliability under the STPIS resulting from such expenditure.
8. Endeavour Energy has identified a number of projects that will deliver a "material" reliability improvement as described in Table 11‑7. While we agree that these specific projects may provide a more targeted reliability improvement, we consider that all N-1 related projects will have an impact on reliability, and that, in aggregate, this impact will be material given the magnitude of the expenditure. Network security is closely linked to network reliability. Degradation in system security is likely to increase risk of prolonged interruptions to consumers or even equipment damage following a contingency event. The AEMC and some service providers also support this view.[[35]](#footnote-35) While individually, a single N-1 investment project may only address one high risk low probability event, collectively however, the volume of works undertaken for the reported $614 million N-1 program is expected to have identifiable and material impacts in supply reliability for each regulatory year subsequent to their completion.

Table 11‑7 Projects identified by Endeavour Energy to have material reliability improvement to reliability of supply

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Project | System SAIDI improvement | Short Rural SAIDI improvement |
| Culburra ZS | 0.13 | 0.8 |
| The Oaks ZS | 0.1 | 0.5 |
| Glenorie | 0.16 | 0.9 |
| Total | 0.39 | 2.20 |

Source: Endeavour Energy[[36]](#footnote-36)

1. Theoretically, Endeavour Energy should only invest in reliability and security improvement projects when it considers it is economically efficient to do so. That is, the benefits to consumers from the investment should outweigh the cost of such investment. However, this was not the case when Endeavour Energy undertook those $660 million investment. We estimated the investment of this magnitude should deliver a system SAIDI improvement of around 55 minutes based on the VCR set out in the STPIS.[[37]](#footnote-37) We recognise that Endeavour Energy was obliged to invest to meet the N-1 requirements in a deterministic manner. While we do not expect the historical investment will actually deliver 55 minutes of improvement, we do expect that material improvement will be delivered in the near future.
2. The application of our STPIS will ensure that past capital expenditure that resulted in reliability improvements are retained because customers are paying for such historical investment on an ongoing manner. In the absence of reliable expenditure data associated with reliability improvement and a robust method that can precisely quantify the impacts of such investment, we consider it is reasonable to examine Endeavour Energy's observed historical reliability performance. The EMRF supported the use of historical SAIDI and SAIFI as they represent the unreliability that consumers actually incur.[[38]](#footnote-38)

Figure 11‑3 Endeavour Energy's unplanned SAIDI historical performance and trends for urban and short rural types (minutes)

1. 

Source: Endeavour Energy, RIN table 6.2.1; AER analysis

Figure 11‑4 Endeavour Energy's unplanned SAIFI historical performance and trends for urban and short rural types (number of interruptions)



Source: Endeavour Energy, RIN table 6.2.2; AER analysis

Figure 11‑5 Endeavour Energy's historical system unplanned SAIDI and SAIFI and trends

1. 

Source: Endeavour Energy, revised RIN tables 6.2.1 and 6.2.2; AER analysis[[39]](#footnote-39)

1. We note that Endeavour Energy's reliability performance trends are either stable or deteriorating. We consider that there are two possible explanations for this:
   * + - 1. the impact of weather and other external events,
         2. Endeavour Energy's action that resulted in deteriorating reliability performance of the network.
2. If the stochastic nature of the weather is the reason for the apparent degradation in reliability, this will be apparent in improving future performance and Endeavour Energy will receive a STPIS reward that will balance the current performance penalties.
3. Should the deteriorating reliability performance be a result of Endeavour Energy's action that resulted in degradation of network performance, then the STPIS scheme is designed to penalise Endeavour Energy for this outcome and return this penalty amount to the consumers.
4. Neither of these two scenarios provides justification for us to not apply a reasonable adjustment to the reliability targets to reflect the N-1 expenditures.
5. We do not observe any overall reliability improvement trend from Endeavour Energy's performance over the last five regulatory years as illustrated in Figure 11‑3 to Figure 11‑5, therefore we cannot use a trend analysis for Endeavour Energy as we have applied to Ausgrid to adjust the performance targets of Endeavour Energy.[[40]](#footnote-40) However, we still consider some improvement is likely to be evident over the 2015-19 regulatory control period. We have therefore made some small adjustment to capture this likely movement in reliability.
6. As noted above, in the 2009–14 regulatory control period, Endeavour Energy has spent:

* $614 million to improve its system security to meet the N-1 planning standard
* $46 million of capex relates to reliability improvements.

Such expenditure represents around 10 per cent of Endeavour Energy's regulatory asset base. We consider this significant expenditure should deliver a material improvement in reliability performance. However, we do not have a robust method that can precisely quantify the impacts of such investment and the data available to date to show any discernible reliability improvement as a result of such investment. Due to these limitations, we propose to use Ausgrid's performance improvement as a proxy to quantify the potential reliability improvement from Endeavour Energy's past expenditure.

Ausgrid’s unplanned system SAIDI and SAIFI trends are showing sustained improving reliability performance in the past five years. We propose to apply Ausgrid's trend as the benchmark for estimating the potential reliability improvement to account for Endeavour Energy's $660 million of security and reliability investment in the 2009–14 regulatory control period. We expect a similar level of SAIDI and SAIFI improvement by Endeavour Energy, after taking into account their relative past investments and sizes.

1. We have apportioned the calculated system SAIDI and SAIFI adjustment percentages for Ausgrid to Endeavour Energy based on their reported relative N-1 and reliability improvement expenditure in the 2009–14 regulatory control period (E) and their relative total customer numbers (N).[[41]](#footnote-41) That is:
2. The apportioned SAIDI adjustment for Endeavour Energy is 3.54 per cent and the apportioned SAIFI adjustment is 7.97 per cent.[[42]](#footnote-42) We have applied these apportioned SAIDI and SAIFI adjustment percentages for Endeavour Energy to adjust its respective 5 year average performance targets for each feeder type. Table 11‑8 sets out our proposed unplanned SAIDI and SAIFI targets for Endeavour Energy.

Table 11‑8 Our proposed indicative performance targets for Endeavour Energy's reliability of supply component[[43]](#footnote-43)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 1. Performance target based on five year average | 1. Our proposed performance target | 1. Difference (%) |
| 1. Unplanned SAIDI |  |  |  |
| 1. Urban | 1. 60.55 | 1. 58.40 | 1. 3.54 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 184.84 | 1. 178.30 | 1. 3.54 |
| 1. Unplanned SAIFI |  |  |  |
| 1. Urban | 1. 0.801 | 1. 0.737 | 1. 7.97 |
| 1. Short rural | 1. 1.825 | 1. 1.679 | 1. 7.97 |

Source: AER analysis.

1. We acknowledge the above adjustment may be imprecise. However, we consider these adjustments reasonably balance the risks of:

* consumers paying twice for the previously funded reliability improvements if we did not take Endeavour Energy's historical reliability and security investment into account when setting the performance targets; and
* Endeavour Energy receiving unreasonable penalties under the adjusted performance targets.

Incentive rates

1. Clause 6.6.2(b)(3) of the NER stipulates that we must take into account the willingness of the customer to pay for improved service performance when developing and implementing a STPIS. The incentive rates in the STPIS are based on measures of customers willingness to pay for performance, specifically, the value that customers place on supply reliability, referred to as the VCR.
2. In the stage 2 framework and approach paper, we proposed to apply the method and VCR values in the STPIS to calculate the incentive rates.[[44]](#footnote-44) Endeavour Energy proposed to apply the VCR as set out in clause 3.2.2(b) of the STPIS and calculate the incentive rates in accordance with Appendix B of the STPIS. It noted this amount may change once the national VCR review is completed by AEMO and the ENA.[[45]](#footnote-45)
3. The CCP did not support NSW DNSP's finding that consumers wish to maintain current levels of reliability as consumers were not asked the right questions. The CCP believed that consumers highly value lower prices and may prefer lower prices even if that meant a greater risk of slightly reduced reliability.[[46]](#footnote-46) Similarly, AGL doubted NSW DNSP's ability to link changes in customers' value of reliability to relevant changes in costs using customers' responses.[[47]](#footnote-47)

Clause 3.2.2(a) of the STPIS allows us to apply alternative incentive rates that are not based on the VCR set out in clause 3.2.2(b) of the scheme. When we developed the STPIS, we considered the VCR figures should be based on the most recent documented and robust work on reliability incentive rates.[[48]](#footnote-48) The VCR set out in the current STPIS was based on the 2008 Victorian study conducted by Charles River Associates (CRA) for VENCorp.[[49]](#footnote-49) We propose to apply the 2014 AEMO NSW VCR to calculate the incentive rates for Endeavour Energy as it better meets the STPIS objective.[[50]](#footnote-50)

1. We note the AEMO has carried out a review of the VCR and published the final results in September 2014. It surveyed approximately 3000 residential, business and direct-connect customers across all NEM states. It adopted a survey-based choice modelling and contingent valuation approach to derive the VCR values. Its assessment found that residential VCR values have not substantially changed since the 2007–08 values, however, VCR values for the commercial and agricultural sectors are notably lower than the 2007–08 values. It considered that this was the result of increased electricity costs and the implementation of energy efficiency savings by businesses in these sectors.[[51]](#footnote-51)

We propose to apply the 2014 AEMO NSW VCR to calculate the incentive rates for Endeavour Energy as it better meets the STPIS objective.[[52]](#footnote-52) We consider the AEMO's revised VCR values are robust as it has taken meticulous steps to ensure the accuracy of those values. In particular, we note in delivering the final results, the AEMO:[[53]](#footnote-53)

* published an Issues Paper in March 2013, seeking stakeholders' submission on how best to determine the VCR and how would the VCR should be applied
* published a Directions Paper in May 2013, setting out its proposal on how best to measure the VCR
* published a Statement of Approach in November 2013, building on the stakeholder feedback and issues raised over the review process, including consultation with the ABS. The Statement of Approach was complemented by a methodology paper provided by Professor Riccardo Scarpa, setting out the underlying survey design and methodology for calculating VCR values based on a choice modelling technique.
* commissioned a market research firm to undertake pilot surveys in November and December 2013
* held a stakeholder workshop in January 2014 to discuss issues arising from the pilot surveys. The AEMO also updated Statement of Approach detailing the changes made to the survey approach in light of the outcomes from the pilot study
* conducted main surveys from March to July 2014 in line with the approach set out in the updated Statement of Approach
* modelled and analysed results in August and September 2014 and sought Dr Bill Kaye-Blake of PwC in NZ to review the final results.

The 2014 AEMO study is the first time that a VCR study has been carried out to deliver such values on a NEM wide basis. We consider that AEMO's NSW VCR value better reflects the willingness of customers to pay for the reliable supply in the NSW compared to the prescribed VCR that was based on the Victorian study. The AEMO surveys were undertaken in the middle of this year, which would more accurately reveal customers' current value of supply reliably. The sample size of the AEMO surveys is significantly larger than the 2008 CRA study and in presenting its final results, the AEMO has also engaged and consulted with stakeholders extensively. As a result, we consider the 2014 AEMO VCR values provide more reliable and robust results than that set out in the STPIS. The revised AEMO VCR values are lower than the previous values, which is in line with the CCP view that consumers now places less value for reliability.

1. Our draft decision is to apply the 2014 AEMO NSW VCR of $38,350/MWh to calculate Endeavour Energy's incentive rates for its urban and short rural feeder type.[[54]](#footnote-54) We consider this value better meets the STPIS objectives as it takes into account the most recent customers' willingness to pay for improved performance in the delivery of services. Table 11-2 sets out our indicative incentive rates to apply to Endeavour Energy's SAIDI and SAIFI targets calculated based on these revised VCR values.

### Customer service component

1. The telephone answering parameter measures the proportion of calls forwarded to an operator that are answered in 30 seconds. In the stage 2 framework and approach paper, we proposed to apply the telephone answering parameter to the NSW DNSPs and to set the performance target on average performance over the past five regulatory years.[[55]](#footnote-55) We consider this remains to be the reasonable approach in setting the telephone answering target for Endeavour Energy.
2. Endeavour Energy proposed to set the telephone answering target at 75 per cent based on the historical performance from February 2013 instead of using the average performance for the last five years. It submitted that its historical performance does not reflect its current performance as scale efficiencies cannot be achieved due to its retail separation as part of the Transitional Service Agreement (TSA). Prior to retail separation in February 2013, Endeavour Energy's call centre had significantly more staff to take both retail and network related calls. It further noted its customer engagement initiatives have not indicated that customers would be willing to pay more for improved service levels.[[56]](#footnote-56)
3. We recognise Endeavour Energy's telephone answering performance might decline with the expiry of its TSA. As the opex allowance that we have provided in this draft decision is based on the efficient benchmark findings, we should also assess Endeavour Energy's proposed telephone answering performance target with consideration of an equivalent efficient business. The Victorian DNSPs' performance target provides a reasonable benchmark because they are generally more efficient in network operations.
4. We consider a reasonable benchmark is the average telephone answering performance of all the Victorian DNSPs as no individual Victorian DNSP represents similar network composition to that of Endeavour Energy. Table 11‑9 indicates the average telephone answering performance target of the Victorian DNSPs is 68.53 per cent. As Endeavour Energy's proposed performance target is better than the comparable benchmark, we accept Endeavour Energy's proposed telephone answering target of 75 per cent.

Table 11‑9 Current telephone answering performance targets for the Victorian DNSPs

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | 1. Telephone answering target (%) |
| 1. CitiPower | 1. 71.52 |
| 1. Powercor | 1. 64.84 |
| 1. Jemena | 1. 61.16 |
| 1. SP AusNet | 1. 82.31 |
| 1. United Energy | 1. 62.83 |
| 1. Average | 1. 68.53 |

Source: AER, Final decision Victorian electricity distribution network service providers distribution determination 2011–2015, October 2010, p.730.

1. Consistent with Endeavour Energy's proposal and clause 5.3.2(a)(1) of the STPIS, an incentive rate of -0.04 per cent per unit will apply to Endeavour Energy's telephone answering parameter.

1. AER, Electricity distribution network service providers—service target performance incentive scheme, 1 November 2009. (AER, Electricity distribution STPIS, Nov 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. AER, Transitional decision for NSW and ACT DNSPs, 16 April 2014, p.49. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. AER, Stage 2 framework and approach NSW distributors, January 2014, pp.14-15; AER, Stage 2 framework and approach ActewAGL, January 2014, pp.14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Endeavour Energy, Endeavour Energy regulatory proposal – 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2019, May 2014, p.28. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.5-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. We have taken Endeavour Energy's estimated 2013/14 data to set the indicative performance targets for this draft decision. We will set the performance targets for reliability of supply parameters based on the actual 2013/14 data for the final decision once we have verified the data. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. AEMO, Value of customer reliability review final report, September 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. We will update the incentive rates based on the average of the smoothed annual revenue determined in the final decision and the revised SAIDI and SAIFI performance targets based on the actual data for 2013/14. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, p.9. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.6-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Endeavour Energy, Endeavour Energy regulatory proposal – 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2019, May 2014, p.28. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.5-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.4-6,10-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.6-9.. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. NER, clause 6.6.2(b)(3)(iv). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Clause 1.5(b)(5) of the STPIS [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. AER, Overview, Endeavour Energy distribution determination 2014-15 to 2018-19, November 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Included in the distributor's approved forecast capex for the subsequent period. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. AER, Stage 2 framework and approach Ausgrid, Endeavour Energy and Essential Energy, January 2014, pp.14-15. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. CCP, CCP1 submission to AER re NSW DNSPs' regulatory proposals 2014–19, 15 August 2014, p.39. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Origin, Submission to Ausgrid, Endeavour, Essential initial 2015-19 regulatory proposal, August 2014, p.37 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Endeavour Energy, Endeavour Energy regulatory proposal – 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2019, May 2014, p.28. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Endeavour Energy, Endeavour Energy regulatory proposal – 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2019, May 2014, p.28. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.5-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Endeavour Energy, Endeavour Energy regulatory proposal – 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2019, May 2014, p.28. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. CCP, CCP1 submission to AER re NSW DNSPs' regulatory proposals 2014–19, 15 August 2014, p.12 [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.10-16. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. AER, Final decision South Australia distribution determination 2010-11 to 2014-15, May 2010, p.194 [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Reliability and performance licence conditions for electricity distributors – the Hon Anthony Roberts MP Minster for Resources & Energy, 1 July 2014 [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Reliability and performance licence conditions for electricity distributors explanatory note, Commencement date 1 July 2014, p.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, p.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. EUAA, Submission to NSW electricity distribution revenue proposals (2014/15 to 2018/19), 8 August 2014, pp. 4 & 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Design, reliability and performance licence conditions for distribution network service providers – Ian Macdonald, MLC Minister for Energy, 1 December 2007, Schedule 1 [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Endeavour Energy, Information request response AER Endeavour Energy 005, 28 July 2014, pp.1-7. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Endeavour Energy, Information request response AER Endeavour Energy 005, 28 July 2014, pp.3-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. AER, Electricity distribution network service providers—service target performance incentive scheme, 1 November 2009, Clause 3.2.1. (AER, Electricity distribution STPIS, Nov 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. AEMC, Rule determination national electricity amendment (network service provider expenditure objectives) rule 2013, 19 September 2013, p.17. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Endeavour Energy, Information request response AER Endeavour Energy 005, 28 July 2014, pp.3-10. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. We have converted $660 million to the annual cost to customers based on a WACC of 10.02 per cent as determined in the 2009–2014 NSW distribution determination and an assumed asset life of 50 years. This amount is then divided by the customers' value of each lost minute calculated using the VCR set out in the STPIS escalated by the CPI. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. EMRF, Submission on NSW electricity distribution revenue reset, July 2014, p.86 [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Note instead of using the total SAIDI and SAIFI number reported by Endeavour Energy in RIN tables 6.2.1 and 6.2.2, we calculated the system SAIDI and SAIFI based on the reported SAIDI and SAIFI for urban and short rural feeder types and the customer numbers for the urban and short rural feeder types as reported in RIN table 6.2.5. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. AER, Draft decision for Ausgrid distribution determination 2015–19, November 2014, Attachment 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. We have considered the use of relative RAB to apportion the adjustment instead of customer number, however we noted a few issues with it. RAB can vary based on different previous capex, depreciation and asset ages while the total customer numbers is not subject to such variations. Therefore we consider the total customer numbers are better used for this purpose. We have applied 5.50 per cent reduction to Ausgrid's average unplanned SAIDI targets and 12.38 per cent reduction to Ausgrid's average unplanned SAIFI targets. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. We have calculated these adjustments by taking the mid-point of Ausgrid's estimated N-1 and reliability investment of $1.9 billion and the average customer numbers reported by Ausgrid and Endeavour Energy in RIN table 6.2.5 for the 2009/10–2013/14 period. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. We have taken Endeavour Energy's estimated 2013/14 data to set the indicative performance targets for this draft decision. We will set the performance targets for reliability of supply parameters based on the actual 2013/14 data for the final decision once we have verified the data. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. AER, Stage 2 framework and approach 2014–2019 Ausgrid, Endeavour Energy and Essential Energy, January 2014, p.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, p.6. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. CCP, CCP1 submission to AER re NSW DNSPs' regulatory proposals 2014–19, 15 August 2014, pp.11-2 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. AGL, Submission on NSW electricity distribution networks regulatory proposals: 2014-19, 8 August 2014, pp.12-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. AER, Electricity distribution network service providers Service target performance incentive scheme, Final decision, June 2008, p 17. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. AER, Explanatory statement proposed amendment service target performance incentive scheme, February 2009, p.16. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Note the AEMO NSW VCR represents customers' willingness to pay in both the NSW and the ACT. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. AEMO, Value of customer reliability review final report, September 2014, pp.1-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Note the AEMO NSW VCR includes survey results of consumers of the ACT. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. AEMO, Value of customer reliability review final report, September 2014, pp.6-8. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. $38,350/MWh is the reported 2014 AEMO NSW VCR excluding direct connect customers. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. AER, Stage 2 framework and approach paper, January 2014, p.14. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Endeavour Energy, STPIS Proposal 2014–2019 regulatory control period, May 2014, pp.7-9. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)