

FINAL DECISION

Jemena distribution determination

2016 to 2020

Attachment 11 – Service target performance incentive scheme

May 2016

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1. Note
2. This attachment forms part of the AER's final decision on Jemena's distribution determination for 2016–20. It should be read with all other parts of the final decision.
3. The final decision includes the following documents:
4. Overview
5. Attachment 1 – Annual revenue requirement
6. Attachment 2 – Regulatory asset base
7. Attachment 3 – Rate of return
8. Attachment 4 – Value of imputation credits
9. Attachment 5 – Regulatory depreciation
10. Attachment 6 – Capital expenditure
11. Attachment 7 – Operating expenditure
12. Attachment 8 – Corporate income tax
13. Attachment 9 – Efficiency benefit sharing scheme
14. Attachment 10 – Capital expenditure sharing scheme
15. Attachment 11 – Service target performance incentive scheme
16. Attachment 12 – Demand management incentive scheme
17. Attachment 13 – Classification of services
18. Attachment 14 – Control mechanisms
19. Attachment 15 – Pass through events
20. Attachment 16 – Alternative control services
21. Attachment 17 – Negotiated services framework and criteria
22. Attachment 18 – f-factor scheme

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1. Shortened forms

| Shortened form | Extended form |
| --- | --- |
| AEMC | Australian Energy Market Commission |
| AEMO | Australian Energy Market Operator |
| AER | Australian Energy Regulator |
| AMI | Advanced metering infrastructure |
| augex | augmentation expenditure |
| capex | capital expenditure |
| CCP | Consumer Challenge Panel |
| CESS | capital expenditure sharing scheme |
| CPI | consumer price index |
| DRP | debt risk premium |
| DMIA | demand management innovation allowance |
| DMIS | demand management incentive scheme |
| distributor | distribution network service provider |
| DUoS | distribution use of system |
| EBSS | efficiency benefit sharing scheme |
| ERP | equity risk premium |
| Expenditure Assessment Guideline | Expenditure Forecast Assessment Guideline for Electricity Distribution |
| F&A | framework and approach |
| MRP | market risk premium |
| NEL | national electricity law |
| NEM | national electricity market |
| NEO | national electricity objective |
| NER | national electricity rules |
| NSP | network service provider |
| opex | operating expenditure |
| PPI | partial performance indicators |
| PTRM | post-tax revenue model |
| RAB | regulatory asset base |
| RBA | Reserve Bank of Australia |
| repex | replacement expenditure |
| RFM | roll forward model |
| RIN | regulatory information notice |
| RPP | revenue and pricing principles |
| SAIDI | system average interruption duration index |
| SAIFI | system average interruption frequency index |
| SLCAPM | Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model |
| STPIS | service target performance incentive scheme |
| WACC | weighted average cost of capital |

# Service target performance incentive scheme

Under clause 6.3.2 of the NER our regulatory determination must specify how any applicable service target performance incentive scheme (STPIS) is to apply in the 2015–20 regulatory control period.

We published the current version of our national STPIS in November 2009.[[1]](#footnote-1) The STPIS is intended to balance incentives to reduce expenditure with the need to maintain or improve service quality. It achieves this by providing financial incentives to distributors to maintain and improve service performance where customers are willing to pay for these improvements.

This attachment sets out how we will apply the STPIS to Jemena Electricity Networks (Jemena) for the 2016─20 regulatory control period.

## Final decision

Our final decision is to apply the STPIS to Jemena for the 2016–20 regulatory control period and it will be to:

* set revenue at risk for Jemena at the range ± 5.0 per cent
* segment Jemena’s network according to feeder categories urban and short rural
* set applicable reliability of supply system average interruption duration index (SAIDI), system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI), momentary average interruption frequency index (MAIFI) and customer service (telephone answering) parameters
* set performance targets based on the Jemena's average performance over the past five regulatory years
* apply the methodology indicated in the national STPIS for excluding specific events from the calculation of annual performance targets
* apply the methodology and value of customer reliability (VCR) values to the calculation of incentive rates using the latest VCR for Victoria.
* not apply the guaranteed service level of the STPIS as Jemena is subjected to the Victorian GSL scheme.

In making our final decision on the application of STPIS, we have taken into account our preliminary decision, framework and approach paper, Jemena's regulatory proposals, our information requests to Jemena and submissions raised by stakeholders. Our response to the matters raised by Jemena and stakeholders about the application of the STPIS are also discussed in this final decision.

### Revenue at risk

The maximum level of penalty or reward under the STPIS is calculated as a percentage adjustment to Jemena’s total revenue. The S-factor adjustment is subject to the revenue at risk cap.[[2]](#footnote-2)

The revenue at risk for Jemena for each regulatory year of the 2016–20 regulatory control period will be capped at ±5 .0 per cent of the annual allowable revenue. Within this overall cap, there is also a cap on the revenue at risk of ± 0.5 per cent for the telephone answering parameter.

### Incentive rates

Incentive rates are the penalty or reward that Jemena receives for a single unit variation in performance.[[3]](#footnote-3) The incentive rates parameters are calculated with reference to the VCR.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Our calculated incentives rates for the 2016–20 regulatory control period are outlined in Table 11.1. The incentive rate for the customer service component will be ─0.040 per cent per unit of the telephone answering parameter.

Our preliminary decision incorrectly calculated the incentive rates using Jemena's total energy consumption instead of average energy consumption.[[5]](#footnote-5) This final decision has corrected for this oversight.

Table 11.1 Final decision—STPIS incentive rates for Jemena for the 2016–20 regulatory control period

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Urban | Short rural |
| SAIDI | 0.0651 | 0.0026 |
| SAIFI | 3.9019 | 0.2114 |
| MAIFI | 0.3122 | 0.0169 |

Source: AER Analysis.

### Performance targets

We will apply the SAIDI, SAIFI and MAIFI reliability of supply parameters as performance targets to Jemena.[[6]](#footnote-6) These targets will be set by reference to Jemena's reliability performance in the previous regulatory control period.[[7]](#footnote-7)

We will apply the telephone answering parameter to Jemena. We accept Jemena's proposed performance target that 64.235 per cent of calls will be answered within 30 seconds.[[8]](#footnote-8)

We will not apply the STPIS Guaranteed Service Level (GSL) scheme as Jemena must comply with the existing jurisdictional GSL scheme.

Our final decision on the performance targets for Jemena's STPIS parameters based on our calculation results are presented on Table 11.2.

Table 11.2 Final decision—STPIS reliability targets for Jemena for the  
2016–20 regulatory control period

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | value |
| Urban |  |
| SAIDI | 55.401 |
| SAIFI | 0.954 |
| MAIFI | 0.756 |
| Rural short |  |
| SAIDI | 91.955 |
| SAIFI | 1.238 |
| MAIFI | 1.654 |
| Telephone answering |  |
| Percentage of calls will be answered within 30 seconds | 64.235 |

Source: AER analysis.

## Jemena's revised proposal

With the exception of the incentive rates calculation, Jemena's revised regulatory proposal accepted our preliminary decision on the application of the STPIS.[[9]](#footnote-9)

## Assessment approach

We are required to make a decision on how the STPIS is to apply to Jemena.[[10]](#footnote-10) When making a distribution determination, the STPIS requires us to determine all performance targets, incentive rates, revenue at risk and other parameters required to apply the scheme.[[11]](#footnote-11)

We outlined our proposed approach to, and justification for, the application of the STPIS in our framework and approach paper and preliminary decisions for Victorian electricity distributors.

Our final decision is consistent with the position in the preliminary decision and framework and approach paper, unless new information has become available or new arguments have been put forward which warrants a reconsideration of this position. We have considered materials submitted to us by Jemena and by stakeholders.[[12]](#footnote-12)

### Interrelationships

In applying the STPIS we must consider any other incentives available to the distributor under the NER or relevant distribution determination.[[13]](#footnote-13) One of the objectives of the STPIS is to ensure that the incentives are sufficient to offset any financial incentives the distributor may have to reduce costs at the expense of service levels.[[14]](#footnote-14) For the 2016–20 regulatory control period, the STPIS will interact with the Capital Expenditure Sharing Scheme (CESS) and the opex Expenditure Benefit Sharing Scheme (EBSS).

The reward and penalty amounts under STPIS are determined based on the average customer value for the improvement, or otherwise, to supply reliability   
(the VCR). This is aimed at ensuring that the distributor’s operational and investment strategies are consistent with customers’ value for the services that are offered to them.

Our capex and opex allowances are set to reasonably reflect the expenditures required by a prudent and efficient business to achieve the capex and opex objectives. These include complying with all applicable regulatory obligations and requirements and, in the absence of such obligations, maintaining quality, reliability, and security outcomes.

The STPIS, on the other hand, provides an incentive for distributors to invest in further reliability improvements (via additional STPIS rewards) where customers are willing to pay for it. Conversely, the STPIS penalises distributors where they let reliability deteriorate. Importantly, the distributor will only receive a financial reward after actual improvements are delivered to the customers.

In conjunction with CESS and EBSS, the STPIS will ensure that:

* any additional investments to improve reliability are based on prudent economic decisions
* reductions in capex and opex are achieved efficiently, rather than at the expense of service levels to customers.

## Application of the STPIS for 2016–20

We will apply the scheme as is to Jemena's STPIS for the 2016–20 regulatory control period. This is consistent with our preliminary decision on STPIS for Jemena.[[15]](#footnote-15)

### Revenue at risk

Jemena's revenue at risk for each regulatory year of the 2016–20 regulatory control period will be capped at ± 5.0 per cent. Within this, there will be a cap of ± 0.5 per cent for the customer service component.

Revenue at risk caps the potential rewards and penalties for Jemena under the STPIS. We consider an incentive of ± 5.0 per cent of the annual allowable revenue should balance the risk to both consumers and Jemena and thus better meet the objectives of the STPIS.

### Reliability of supply component

Applicable components and parameters

We will apply unplanned SAIDI, unplanned SAIFI and unplanned MAIFI parameters under the reliability of supply component to Jemena's urban and short rural feeders for the 2016–20 regulatory control period. Unplanned SAIDI measures the sum of the duration of each unplanned sustained customer interruption (in minutes) divided by the total number of distribution customers. Unplanned SAIFI measures the total number of unplanned sustained customer interruptions divided by the total number of distribution customers. Unplanned MAIFI measures the total number of momentary interruptions divided by the total number of distribution customers.

Exclusions

The STPIS allows certain events to be excluded from the calculation of the S-factor revenue adjustment. These exclusions include the events that are beyond the control of Jemena, such as the effects of transmission network outages and other upstream events. They also exclude the effects of extreme weather events that have the potential to significantly affect Jemena's STPIS performance.

The major event day (MED) thresholds will be calculated using the 2.5 beta method in accordance with appendix D of the STPIS.[[16]](#footnote-16)

### Performance targets

The STPIS specifies that the performance targets should be based on the average performance over the past five regulatory years. It also states that the performance targets must be modified for any reliability improvements completed or planned where the planned reliability improvements are:[[17]](#footnote-17)

* included in the expenditure program proposed by the distributor in its regulatory proposal, or
* proposed by the distributor, and the cost of the improvements is allowed by the relevant regulator, in the distributor's previous regulatory proposal or regulatory submission, and
* expected to result in a material improvement in supply reliability.

Jemena proposed to set the performance targets based on historical averages, without adjustments for reliability improvement expenditure, as per the scheme. We accept this approach and accept that the capex allowance under this decision does not result in any material increases in reliability performance—thus no adjustments to Jemena's targets are required.[[18]](#footnote-18)

The national STPIS customer service target applicable to Jemena is telephone response measured as the percentage of telephone calls answered within 30 seconds. This measure is referred to as the telephone Grade of Service (GOS).

Consequently, our calculated performance targets for Jemena for the 2016–20 regulatory control period are presented in Table 11.3.

Table 11.3 Final decision—STPIS reliability targets for Jemena for the 2016–20 regulatory control period

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | value |
| **Urban** |  |
| SAIDI | 55.401 |
| SAIFI | 0.954 |
| MAIFI | 0.756 |
| **Rural short** |  |
| SAIDI | 91.955 |
| SAIFI | 1.238 |
| MAIFI | 1.654 |
| **Telephone answering** |  |
| Percentage of calls will be answered within 30 seconds | 64.235 |

Source: AER Analysis.

### Incentive rates

The incentive rates applicable to Jemena for the reliability of supply performance parameters of the STPIS have been calculated in accordance with clause 3.2.2 and using the formulae provided as appendix B of our National STPIS. Our final decision of Jemena's incentive rates are at Table 11.4. The incentive rate for the customer service component will be ─0.040 per cent per unit of the telephone answering parameter.[[19]](#footnote-19)

Table 11.4 Final decision—STPIS incentive rates for Jemena for the 2016–20 regulatory control period

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Urban | Short rural |
| SAIDI | 0.0651 | 0.0026 |
| SAIFI | 3.9019 | 0.2114 |
| MAIFI | 0.3122 | 0.0169 |

Source: AER Analysis.

### Value of customer reliability to calculate the incentive rates

Our F&A paper stated that we will apply a revised value for VCR through the distribution determination in calculating Jemena’s incentive rates.[[20]](#footnote-20) For this final decision, we have calculated Jemena’s incentive rates by deriving the VCR from Jemena’s consumption data, the other Victorian electricity distributors’ consumption data and AEMO’s published state wide VCR.

The VCR for Jemena's urban and short rural segments is $ 39.03 per kWh. We have applied this VCR to calculate its incentives rates for 2016–20.

### Adjusting STPIS targets for potential bushfire related expenditure

We received a submission from the Victorian Government recommending we consider the reliability benefits of installing repaid earth current fault limiters (REFCLs) in determining the performance targets.[[21]](#footnote-21) The Victorian government quoted the findings from a study by Northpower in New Zealand to conclude that there are reliability benefits in installing REFCL.

We agree that the installation of REFCLs may impact on the reliability of supply.[[22]](#footnote-22) However, we anticipate these reliability benefits on Jemena's networks to be relatively minor as according to Jemena:

* REFCLs will only operate in full service a small number of days of the year.
* The installation of 4 REFCL devices over the 2016–20 regulatory control period will affect only a small proportion of Jemena's assets (this is a low proportion as contemplated by the Powerline Bushfire Safety Taskforce).
* Most REFCL devices are expected to be installed late in the 2016–20 regulatory control period and any reliability benefits will not emerge until 2020.
* The devices will be installed in rural areas which only cover three percent of Jemena’s customers—as STPIS is calculated based on average performance across the customer base the impact is diluted significantly.[[23]](#footnote-23)

That said, the scheme, where relevant, has provisions to make adjustments to Jemena's targets in the 2021–2025 regulatory control period for capital expenditure spent that may improve reliability. This will ensure that consumers are not paying for the expenditure again through STPIS for improvement resulting from this expenditure.[[24]](#footnote-24)

### Adjusting the STPIS targets for benefits associated with smart meters

Based on a report by Deloitte in 2011,[[25]](#footnote-25) the Victorian Government suggested that distributors’ historical 5-year average STPIS targets should be adjusted as result of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (commonly known as smart meters) program. Specifically, the following benefits were identified in the Deloitte report:

* reduction in unserved energy due to faster detection of outages and restoration times
* low voltage network monitoring improvement benefits
* rural and semi-rural area notification time improvement benefits
* outage Management innovation benefits.

All distributors refuted the Victorian Government’s claims about the benefits of smart meters and commented that the assumptions used by Deloitte in its 2011 report were flawed and not based on actual observation.

We consider that there is insufficient evidence to support the extent of improvements to reliability claimed by the 2011 Deloitte report because:

* Only Jemena and AusNet Services achieved sustained performance improvement in the last regulatory period, whereas the CitiPower, Powercor and United Energy––all of whom achieved a very high rate of AMI implementation––did not report improvement in supply reliability.
* On specific SAIDI benefits[[26]](#footnote-26), Powercor stated that faster outage detection does not result in a change in the number or duration of outages recorded for STPIS purposes. Earlier notification of the fault means the distributor starts recording the outage sooner and commencing restoration procedures faster; however, this does not result in a reduction in the duration of the outage for STPIS purposes because the response process is the same.[[27]](#footnote-27)

## Transitional arrangements for the STPIS

This section addresses the following transitional issues relating to the STPIS:

* how we intend to adjust the S-factor between regulatory control periods
* how we intend to account for revenue increments or decrements resulting from the STPIS outcomes between regulatory control periods
* how we will close out Essential Services Commission service performance scheme for 2006–10.

### S-factor adjustment between regulatory control periods

The STPIS operates as part of the building block determination and is applied via the control mechanism. Through the S-factor component of the STPIS, distributors are penalised or rewarded for diminished or improved service performance compared to predetermined targets. Distributors are either rewarded or penalised via network charges two years after the end of each regulatory year because audited performance data would only be available after the regulatory year is completed––hence, the earliest time the S-factor can apply is the year following audited performance data availability.

Consequently, the S-factor outcomes of 2014 and 2015 will apply to prices in the 2016 and 2017 regulatory years respectively.

The revenue at risk cap limits the risk of the STPIS to Jemena at ± 5.0 per cent of the annual allowable revenue. However, distributors may exceed this cap where there are increases or decreases to the amount of the annual allowable revenue requirement that they can recover between regulatory control periods. The STPIS scheme accounts for the differences to the allowable revenue recoverable between regulatory control periods by making an adjustment to the "raw"[[28]](#footnote-28) S-factor for the last and second last regulatory years of the current regulatory control period (which is applied in the first and second regulatory years of the next regulatory control period) by adjusting the raw S-factor value based on:

the percentage change between the annual revenue requirement in the last regulatory year of the previous regulatory control period and the annual revenue requirement for first regulatory year of the next regulatory control period taken from the post-tax revenue model.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Hence, the revenue at risk cap for the first two years of the next regulatory control period will be adjusted based on the approved revenue at risk cap of the previous regulatory control period.

### Accounting revenue increments decrements between regulatory control periods

A distributor's performance in the last regulatory year of its regulatory control period will affect its revenue in the second regulatory year in the next regulatory control period.

For example, if a distributor has a regulatory control period of five regulatory years between 1 July 2007 and 30 June 2012, its performance in the 2011–12 financial year will affect its revenues in the second regulatory year of the next regulatory control period (that is from 1 July 2014).[[30]](#footnote-30)

The STPIS provides a mechanism to account for any step change in revenues (or prices), via , from one regulatory control period to the next. For Jemena, the ‘raw’   
S-factor calculated for the last and second last regulatory years of the regulatory control period (which is applied in the first and second regulatory years of the next regulatory control period) is adjusted in accordance with the following formula:[[31]](#footnote-32)

Where:

* is the sum of the s-factors for all parameters, after application of the s-bank, as determined in equation (3) in the STPIS
* is Jemena's approved revenue in the 2016 pricing proposal
* is Jemena's allowable revenue in the final determination 2017.

### Closing out of the ESCV’s service performance scheme

Prior to the operation of STPIS from 2011, Victorian distributors were subjected to the Essential Services Commission Victoria’s (ESCV) "S Factor" service performance scheme.

In order to close out the ESCV’s S Factor scheme, we required the final performance data of the distributors’ for 2010. As this information was not available in time for the final decision of the 2011–15 determination, a preliminary close out was factored into the current determination, requiring a final true-up when the final performance data are available. We will complete the close out calculation in the final decision for the 2016─20 regulatory control period. The calculation method on how to close out the ESCV’s scheme was set out in our 2011–15 determination. The close-out of the "S Factor" service performance scheme will result in an adjustment to Jemena's revenue in 2016–17.

In 2012 the Victorian government amended the National Electricity (Victoria) Act 2005 to allow us the power to close out the ESCV’s S–Factor scheme.[[32]](#footnote-33)

The financial penalty accrued by Jemena in the 2006–10 regulatory control period in the allowable revenue for 2016–20 regulatory control period will be $3.81 million   
($ 2015) in total. This amendment to the legislation does not alter or limit our approach to close out the scheme.

This number has been included in the forecast revenue for the forthcoming regulatory control period by including the adjustment in the ‘revenue adjustments’ row of the post-tax revenue model.[[33]](#footnote-34)

1. AER, Electricity distribution network service providers—service target performance incentive scheme, 1 November 2009. (AER, STPIS, November 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 2.1(d)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 2.1(d)(3). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The VCR represents, in dollar terms, the willingness of customers to pay for the reliable supply of electricity. The values produced are used as a proxy in this way, and can be applied for use in revenue regulation, planning and operational purposes in the NEM. In network planning, the VCR is used by AEMO to assess the economic merits of carrying out additional investment in the electricity network. It is therefore important the VCR figures accurately reflect the value of reliability across a range of customers. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Jemena, 2016-20 Electricity Distribution Price Review Regulatory Proposal Revocation and substitution submission Attachment 3-1 Incentive schemes, 6 January 2016, p. 19 [81]. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 2.1(d)(4). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jemena Electricity Networks (Vic) Ltd, 2016-20 Electricity Distribution Price Review Regulatory Proposal, Revocation and substitution submission, Attachment 3-1 Incentive Schemes, 6 January 2016, p. 19 [75]. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Jemena Electricity Networks (Vic) Ltd, 2016-20 Electricity Distribution Price Review Regulatory Proposal, Revocation and substitution submission, Attachment 3-1 Incentive Schemes, 6 January 2016, p. 19 [82]. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Jemena Electricity Networks (Vic) Ltd, 2016-20 Electricity Distribution Price Review Regulatory Proposal, Revocation and substitution submission, Attachment 3-1 Incentive Schemes, 6 January 2016, p. 19 [72]. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. NER, cl. 6.12.1(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 2.1(d). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. AER, Final Framework and approach for Victorian distributors commencing 1 July 2016, October 2014, pp. 96–97. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. NER, cl. 6.6.2(b)(3)(iv). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 1.5(b)(5). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. AER, Preliminary Decision Jemena distribution determination 2016-2020, Attachment 11 – Service target performance incentive scheme, October 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. AER, STPIS, November 2009, Appendix D, pp. 35–37. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 3.2.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Jemena Electricity Networks (Vic) Ltd, 2016-20 Electricity Distribution Price Review Regulatory Proposal, Revocation and substitution submission, Attachment 3-1 Incentive Schemes, 6 January 2016, p. 19 [72]. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 5.3.2(a). Our preliminary decision incorrectly utilised Jemena's total energy consumption instead of average energy consumption to calculate the incentive rates. This final decision has corrected this error by using Jemena's average energy consumption to calculate the incentive rates. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. AER, STPIS, November 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Victorian Department of Economic Development, Jobs, Transport & Resources, Submission to Victorian electricity distribution pricing review – 2016 to 2020, 14 January 2016, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. There is currently no certainty on the scope, implementation timeframe or the magnitude of the program. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Jemena Electricity Networks, Victorian 2016-2020 Electricity Distribution Process Review Submission to the Victorian EDPR Process, 4 February 2016, pp. 18–20. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. AER, STPIS, November 2009, cl. 3.2.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Deloitte, Advanced metering infrastructure cost benefit analysis, August 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Deloitte, Advanced metering infrastructure cost benefit analysis, 2 August 2011, p. 65; Available at ttp://www.smartmeters.vic.gov.au/about-smartmeters/ reports-and-consultations/advanced-metering-infrastructure-cost-benefit-analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Powercor, Further submission to the AER regarding preliminary determination, 4 February 2016, pp. 8–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. "Raw" refers to the S-factor prior to any adjustments. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. AER, STPIS, November 2009, Appendix C, pp. 33–34. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. AER, STPIS, November 2009, appendix C. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. AER, STPIS, November 2009, Appendix C, pp. 33–34. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Energy Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Victoria), s. 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. NER, cll. 6.4.3(a)(5) and (b)(5) as amended by Division 4 of Part 3 to the National Electricity (Victoria) Act 2005. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)