

FINAL DECISION

Powerlink transmission determination

2017−22

Attachment 10 – Capital expenditure sharing scheme

April 2017

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Inquiries about this publication should be addressed to:

Australian Energy Regulator  
GPO Box 520  
Melbourne Vic 3001

Tel: 1300 585 165

Email: [AERInquiry@aer.gov.au](mailto:AERInquiry@aer.gov.au)

1. Note
2. This attachment forms part of the AER's final decision on Powerlink's transmission determination for 2017–22. It should be read with all other parts of the final decision.
3. This final decision consists of an Overview and 11 attachments. As many issues were settled at the draft decision stage or required only minor updates we have not prepared final decision attachments for:

* Regulatory depreciation
* Operating expenditure; and
* Corporate income tax.

1. The AER's final decision on these matters is set out in the Overview. For ease of reference the remaining attachments have been numbered consistently with the attachment numbering in our draft decision.
2. The final decision includes the following documents:
3. Overview
4. Attachment 1 – Maximum allowed revenue
5. Attachment 2 – Regulatory asset base
6. Attachment 3 – Rate of return
7. Attachment 4 – Value of imputation credits
8. Attachment 6 – Capital expenditure
9. Attachment 9 – Efficiency benefit sharing scheme
10. Attachment 10 – Capital expenditure sharing scheme
11. Attachment 11 – Service target performance incentive scheme
12. Attachment 12 – Pricing methodology
13. Attachment 13 – Pass through events

Attachment 14 – Negotiated services

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1. Shortened forms

| Shortened form | Extended form |
| --- | --- |
| 1. AARR | 1. aggregate annual revenue requirement |
| 1. AEMC | 1. Australian Energy Market Commission |
| 1. AEMO | 1. Australian Energy Market Operator |
| 1. AER | 1. Australian Energy Regulator |
| 1. ASRR | 1. annual service revenue requirement |
| 1. augex | 1. augmentation expenditure |
| 1. capex | 1. capital expenditure |
| 1. CCP | 1. Consumer Challenge Panel |
| 1. CESS | 1. capital expenditure sharing scheme |
| 1. CPI | 1. consumer price index |
| 1. DMIA | 1. demand management innovation allowance |
| 1. DRP | 1. debt risk premium |
| 1. EBSS | 1. efficiency benefit sharing scheme |
| 1. ERP | 1. equity risk premium |
| 1. MAR | 1. maximum allowed revenue |
| 1. MRP | 1. market risk premium |
| 1. NEL | 1. national electricity law |
| 1. NEM | 1. national electricity market |
| 1. NEO | 1. national electricity objective |
| 1. NER | 1. national electricity rules |
| 1. NSP | 1. network service provider |
| 1. NTSC | 1. negotiated transmission service criteria |
| 1. opex | 1. operating expenditure |
| 1. PPI | 1. partial performance indicators |
| 1. PTRM | 1. post-tax revenue model |
| 1. RAB | 1. regulatory asset base |
| 1. RBA | 1. Reserve Bank of Australia |
| 1. repex | 1. replacement expenditure |
| 1. RFM | 1. roll forward model |
| 1. RIN | 1. regulatory information notice |
| 1. RPP | 1. revenue and pricing principles |
| 1. SLCAPM | 1. Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model |
| 1. STPIS | 1. service target performance incentive scheme |
| 1. TNSP | 1. transmission network service provider |
| 1. TUoS | 1. transmission use of system |
| 1. WACC | 1. weighted average cost of capital |

# Capital expenditure sharing scheme

The capital expenditure sharing scheme (CESS) provides financial rewards for network service providers whose capex becomes more efficient and financial penalties for those that become less efficient. It achieves this by rewarding service providers that outperform their capex allowance and penalising service providers that spend more than their capex allowance. The CESS also provides a mechanism to share efficiency gains and losses between service providers and network users.

Consumers benefit from improved efficiency through lower regulated prices. This attachment sets out how we will apply the CESS to Powerlink in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.

1. As part of the Better Regulation program we consulted on and published version 1 of the capital expenditure incentive guideline (capex incentive guideline), which sets out the CESS.[[1]](#footnote-1) The CESS approximates efficiency gains and efficiency losses by calculating the difference between forecast and actual capex. It shares these gains or losses between service providers and consumers.
2. The CESS works as follows:

* We calculate the cumulative underspend or overspend for the current regulatory control period in net present value terms.
* We apply the sharing ratio of 30 per cent to the cumulative underspend or overspend to work out what the service provider's share of the underspend or overspend should be.
* We calculate the CESS payments taking into account the financing benefit or cost to the service provider of the underspends or overspends.[[2]](#footnote-2) We can also make further adjustments to account for deferral of capex and ex post exclusions of capex from the RAB.[[3]](#footnote-3)
* The CESS payments will be added or subtracted to the service provider's regulated revenue as a separate building block in the next regulatory control period.

1. Under the CESS a service provider retains 30 per cent of an underspend or overspend, while consumers retain 70 per cent of the underspend on overspend. This means that for a one dollar saving in capex the service provider keeps 30 cents of the benefit while consumers keep 70 cents of the benefit.

## Final decision

We will apply the CESS as set out in version 1 of the capex incentive guideline to Powerlink in the 2017–22 regulatory control period.[[4]](#footnote-4) This is consistent with the proposed approach we set out in our framework and approach paper.[[5]](#footnote-5) We will apply the exclusion from the CESS of capex the service provider incurs in delivering a priority project approved under the network capability component of the Service Target Performance Incentive Scheme (STPIS) for transmission network service providers.[[6]](#footnote-6)

## Powerlink’s revised proposal

Powerlink accepted our draft decision to apply the CESS consistent with our capex incentive guideline.[[7]](#footnote-7)

## AER’s assessment approach

Our approach to the CESS was detailed in our draft decision for Powerlink, attachment 10. This sets out our reasons for deciding to apply the CESS (Version 1) to Powerlink for the forthcoming regulatory control period and the details for how this scheme will apply.[[8]](#footnote-8)

### Interrelationships

1. The CESS relates to other incentives Powerlink faces to incur efficient opex, conduct demand management and maintain or improve service levels.[[9]](#footnote-9) We aim to incentivise network service providers to make efficient decisions on when and what type of expenditure to incur and to balance expenditure efficiencies with service quality. We discuss these interrelationships where relevant as part of our reasons below and in our capex attachment.

## Reasons for final decision

We accept Powerlink's proposal to apply the CESS as set out in the capex incentive guideline. This includes the exclusion provided for under the CESS of capex the service provider incurs in delivering a priority project approved under the network capability component of the transmission STPIS.[[10]](#footnote-10) The reasons for our preference for a CESS are set out in our capital expenditure incentive guideline.[[11]](#footnote-11) In developing the guideline we took into account the capex incentive objective, capex criteria, capex objectives and the NEO. As noted above, our detailed consideration and reasons for this decision are set out in attachment 10 of our draft decision.

1. AER, Capital Expenditure Incentive Guideline for Electricity Network Service Providers, November 2013, pp. 5–9. (AER, Capex incentive guideline, November 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. We calculate benefits as the benefits to the service provider of financing the underspend since the amount of the underspend can be put to some other income generating use during the period. Losses are similarly calculated as the financing cost to the service provider of the overspend. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The capex incentive guideline outlines how we may exclude capex from the RAB. AER, Capex incentive guideline, November 2013, pp. 13–20. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. AER, Capex incentive guideline, November 2013, pp. 5–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. AER, Final Framework and approach for Powerlink, June 2015, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. AER, Capex incentive guideline, November 2013, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Powerlink Queensland, Revised Revenue Proposal - December 2016, p. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. NER, cl 6A.6.5A(e). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Related schemes are the efficiency benefit sharing scheme (EBSS) for opex, and the service target performance incentive scheme (STPIS) for service levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. NER, cl 6A.14.1(5A). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. AER, Capex incentive guideline, November 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)