

PRELIMINARY DECISION

SA Power Networks determination 2015−16 to 2019−20

Attachment 12 − Demand management incentive scheme

April 2015

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1. Note
2. This attachment forms part of the AER's preliminary decision on SA Power Networks' 2015–20 distribution determination. It should be read with all other parts of the preliminary decision.
3. The preliminary decision includes the following documents:
4. Overview
5. Attachment 1 – Annual revenue requirement
6. Attachment 2 – Regulatory asset base
7. Attachment 3 – Rate of return
8. Attachment 4 – Value of imputation credits
9. Attachment 5 – Regulatory depreciation
10. Attachment 6 – Capital expenditure
11. Attachment 7 – Operating expenditure
12. Attachment 8 – Corporate income tax
13. Attachment 9 – Efficiency benefit sharing scheme
14. Attachment 10 – Capital expenditure sharing scheme
15. Attachment 11 – Service target performance incentive scheme
16. Attachment 12 – Demand management incentive scheme
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1. Shortened forms

| Shortened form | Extended form |
| --- | --- |
| AEMC | Australian Energy Market Commission |
| AEMO | Australian Energy Market Operator |
| AER | Australian Energy Regulator |
| augex | augmentation expenditure |
| capex | capital expenditure |
| CCP | Consumer Challenge Panel |
| CESS | capital expenditure sharing scheme |
| CPI | consumer price index |
| DRP | debt risk premium |
| DMIA | demand management innovation allowance |
| DMIS | demand management incentive scheme |
| distributor | distribution network service provider |
| DUoS | distribution use of system |
| EBSS | efficiency benefit sharing scheme |
| ERP | equity risk premium |
| Expenditure Assessment Guideline | Expenditure Forecast Assessment Guideline for electricity distribution |
| F&A | framework and approach |
| MRP | market risk premium |
| NEL | national electricity law |
| NEM | national electricity market |
| NEO | national electricity objective |
| NER | national electricity rules |
| NSP | network service provider |
| opex | operating expenditure |
| PPI | partial performance indicators |
| PTRM | post-tax revenue model |
| RAB | regulatory asset base |
| RBA | Reserve Bank of Australia |
| repex | replacement expenditure |
| RFM | roll forward model |
| RIN | regulatory information notice |
| RPP | revenue and pricing principles |
| SAIDI | system average interruption duration index |
| SAIFI | system average interruption frequency index |
| SLCAPM | Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing model |
| STPIS | service target performance incentive scheme |
| WACC | weighted average cost of capital |

# Demand management incentive scheme

1. The National Electricity Rules (NER) require us to develop and implement mechanisms to incentivise distributors to consider efficient alternatives to building more network.[[1]](#footnote-1) To meet this requirement, and motivated by the need to improve distributors' capability in the demand management area, we implemented a demand management incentive scheme (DMIS) for SA Power Networks', formerly ETSA Utilities, distribution determination for the 2010–15 regulatory control period.[[2]](#footnote-2)
2. The current DMIS for SA Power Networks includes the demand management innovation allowance (DMIA)[[3]](#footnote-3).
3. The DMIA is a capped allowance for distributors to investigate and conduct broad-based and/or peak demand management projects. It contains two parts:
* Part A provides for an innovation allowance to be incorporated into each distributor's revenue allowance for opex each year of the regulatory control period. Distributors prepare annual reports on their expenditure under the DMIA[[4]](#footnote-4) in the previous year, which we then assess against specific criteria.[[5]](#footnote-5)
* Part B compensates distributors for any foregone revenue demonstrated to have resulted from demand management initiatives approved under Part A. We applied this to SA Power Networks during the 2010–15 regulatory control period. However, Part B will no longer be applicable to SA Power Networks during the 2015–2020 regulatory control period given the move to a revenue cap form of control.
1. Under the scheme, we return any underspend against the allowance to customers. Also, once we know the approved DMIA expenditure for each year of the current period, we compensate distributors for approved foregone revenue. We implement this as an adjustment to each distributor's innovation allowance in the following regulatory control period.

## Preliminary decision

1. We have determined to continue Part A of the DMIA for SA Power Networks in the 2015–20 regulatory control period. We will not apply Part B of the DMIA to SA Power Networks for the 2015–2020 regulatory control period because we have decided to apply a revenue cap form of control. This is consistent with our proposed approach in our Framework and Approach (F&A).[[6]](#footnote-6)
2. The current innovation allowance amount of $0.6 million ($2014–15) per annum will continue in the 2015–20 regulatory control period.

## SA Power Networks' proposal

1. SA Power Networks supported the proposed approach set out in our F&A to continue applying Part A of the DMIA at the same scale as is currently applied.[[7]](#footnote-7)
2. SA Power Networks acknowledged the AEMC's Power of Choice review which includes an examination of distributor incentives to pursue efficient alternatives to network augmentation and anticipates new rules and principles guiding the design of a new DMIS. Regarding anticipated changes to the DMIS, SA Power Networks submitted that it was keen on early engagement with us in any discussions on proposed changes to the DMIS and the application and timing of any new scheme.[[8]](#footnote-8)

## AER’s assessment approach

1. The rules require us to have regard to several factors in developing and implementing a DMIS for SA Power Networks.[[9]](#footnote-9) These are:
* Benefits to consumers
* the need to ensure that benefits to electricity consumers likely to result from the scheme are sufficient to warrant any reward or penalty under the scheme
* the willingness of customers or end users to pay for increases in costs resulting from implementing DMIS.
* Balanced incentives
* the effect of a particular control mechanism (i.e. price as distinct from revenue regulation) on a distributor's incentives to adopt or implement efficient non-network alternatives
* the effect of classification of services on a distributor's incentive to adopt or implement efficient embedded generator connections
* the extent the distributor is able to offer efficient pricing structures
* the possible interactions between DMIS and other incentive schemes.
1. We had regard to these factors in considering the proposed approach to the DMIS for SA Power Networks as set out in our F&A[[10]](#footnote-10) and we have again taken these factors into account in making our preliminary decision.

## Reasons for preliminary decision

Considering a significant proportion of SA Power Networks' allowance remains for the current regulatory control period[[11]](#footnote-11), we have determined that the current innovation allowance amount of $0.6 million ($2014–15) per annum will continue in the 2015–20 regulatory control period.

Our F&A stated that our intention to develop and implement a new DMIS for the 2015–20 regulatory control period was dependent on the progress of the rule change process arising from the AEMC’s Power of Choice review.[[12]](#footnote-12) On 19 February 2015, the AEMC commenced consultation on the rule change. Submissions closed on 19 March 2015. The AEMC is currently considering the rule amendments.

1. The Total Environment Centre (TEC) submitted that we should not approve further DMIA expenditure for SA Power Networks without it first providing more detailed information regarding its demand management projects and its strategy. Regarding the move a revenue cap form of control, the TEC noted that the discontinuation of Part B of the DMIA to SA Power Networks results in fewer demand management incentives in the next regulatory control period than in the current one.[[13]](#footnote-13) The Energy Users Coalition of SA accepted the continuation of Part A of the DMIA to SA Power Networks in the 2015–2020 regulatory control period but submitted that greater control is required to ensure the benefits of the scheme exceed the costs to consumers.[[14]](#footnote-14)
2. In response to submissions and consistent with our F&A, we do not intend to pre-empt consultation on the AEMC’s review of the current demand management arrangements by commencing a separate consultation process on a new DMIS before the outcomes of the review are finalised. Quite apart from the unnecessary complications and inefficiencies that a parallel policy process would create, the confines of a distribution revenue review make it ill-suited to driving regulatory reform.
3. We acknowledge the need to reform the existing demand management incentive arrangements and the importance of demand management in deferring the need for network augmentation by alleviating network utilisation during peak usage periods. The move to a revenue cap form of control removes any disincentive for distributors to reduce the quantity of electricity sold by pursuing demand management initiatives. More robust obligations to consider non-network alternatives in order to satisfy RIT-D requirements provide distributors with opportunities to improve and expand their demand management programs.
4. Beyond increasing opportunities, we recognise the importance of strengthening demand management incentives in order to defer network augmentation. However, we do not consider it appropriate to develop an alternative incentive structure in parallel to the AEMC's review through SA Power Networks' regulatory proposal. The AEMC will be able to consider how any changes to the NER can be implemented in the 2015–20 regulatory control period through transitional arrangements.
5. For these reasons, we have adopted the position proposed in our F&A and approved DMIA allowances consistent with their current scale. We will consider the introduction of a revised DMIS as soon as practicable following the AEMC's rule change process.
6. SA Power Networks proposed a number of demand management costs as part of its total forecast operating expenditure building block. Our decision on SA Power Networks' demand management related operating expenditure building block can be found in attachment 7.
1. NER, cl. 6.6.3(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The rules have since changed the name to 'Demand Management and Embedded Generation Connection Incentive Scheme' (DMEGCIS) to explicitly cover innovation with respect to the connection of embedded generation. Our current and proposed DMIS includes embedded generation. We consider embedded generation to be one means of demand management, as it typically reduces demand for power drawn from a distribution network. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. AER, Demand management incentive scheme – Energex, Ergon Energy and ETSA Utilities: 2010–15, 17 October 2008. (AER, DMIA for QLD and SA distributors, October 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The DMIA excludes the costs of demand management initiatives approved in our determination for the 2010–15 regulatory control period. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. AER, DMIA for QLD and SA distributors, October 2008, pp. 5–6. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. AER, Final Framework and Approach paper for SA Power Networks, 30 April 2014, p. 67. (AER, Framework and Approach, April 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. SA Power Networks, SA Power Networks Regulatory Proposal 2015 – 2020, 31 October 2014, p. 293 (SA Power Networks, Regulatory Proposal, October 2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. SA Power Networks, Regulatory Proposal, October 2014, p. 293. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. NER, cl 6.6.3(b). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. AER, Framework and Approach, April 2014, p. 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. AER, Applications by DNSPs for Demand Management Innovation Allowance for 2013 calendar year (Victorian DNSPs) and 2012–13 financial year (all other DNSPs), April 2015, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. AER, Framework and Approach, April 2014, pp. 67-68. For information regarding the AEMC's Power of Choice Review, see <http://www.aemc.gov.au/Major-Pages/Power-of-choice>. The AEMC received a proposed rule change from COAG Energy Ministers and the Total Environment Centre. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Total Environment Centre, Submission to the AER on South Australian Power Networks 2015–2020 regulatory proposal, January 2015, pp. 5 & 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Energy Consumers Coalition of SA, Submission on SA Power Networks' 2015–2020 regulatory proposal, 31 January 2015, p. 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)