



AER Consumer Reference Group

# AER Public Forum

Rate of return

Equity Omnibus – Draft Working paper

CRG **Preliminary** response

11 August 2021

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# Who we are



An independent group set up to:

- Advise the AER on its consumer engagement, and
- Represent the perspectives and interests of consumers

in the context of the RORI review.

Our role derives from the National Electricity Law and National Gas Law.

<https://www.aer.gov.au/about-us/stakeholder-engagement/consumer-reference-group>

# Six issues addressed in the paper (p.5)

Today

- Estimating a forward looking market risk premium (MRP)
- The relationship between the risk free rate and MRP
- The comparator set and estimation period for beta
- The use of cross checks at the overall RoE level
- The equity beta for electricity vs gas networks
- Averaging period — nomination window for equity

Submission

## The regulatory context...

### CAPM

Simple model of reality

Because there is no optimal capital structure

Pursuit of precision can get us no closer to a non-existent reality

Therefore, what is the significance of the CAPM in a regulatory setting?

A model of regulatory expectations (C's & I's) – *not* market expectations.

Stability (regulatory) is a pre-condition for efficient formation of LT expectations

Reliable LT expectations are a prerequisite for efficient LT investment.

Special place of the 2018 RORI (post-LMR environment)

HIGH BAR FOR CHANGE

Persuasive evidence. Compelling reasoning. Broad consensus

# Outline



1. Estimating the MRP
2. Defining the problem
3. A proposed way forward

# What has changed for the MRP?



Special status of the 2018 RORI. It sets the 'benchmark' for the regulatory framework in the post-LMR environment. Defines a new era.

Special pleadings RoR too low (...maybe that hasn't changed).

AER's observation we are in a low interest rate environment (LIRE)

=> 2022 RORI Review is effectively asking: Does LIRE matter to RORI?

RFR = 10 year bond rate: Comparatively stable (1997-2011), Generally declining (2012-2020), Some uptick (2021?) – next slide

Lower RFR => Lower allowed RoR (via CAPM-based estimate of RoE)

Lower ARoR => networks & investors seeking revisions to MRP

Four arguments.

**Figure 3 Historic Australian interest rates on 10 year Government bond yields**



Source: RBA

## (i) Wright Approach + DGM

CAPM:

$$RoE = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$



Fix  $RoE$

“Wright Approach”



Use DGM

to estimate  $R_m$




Incompatible arguments



## (ii) Wright Approach vs CAPM

CAPM:

$$RoE = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$



Incompatible arguments

Also:

Who could possibly believe  
Wright approach will be  
sustainable if/when  $R_f$  increases  
such that:  $R_f > RoE$  (fixed)

### (iii) MRP & RFR

CAPM:

$$RoE = R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f)$$



$$R_m = F_1(R_f)$$



$$RoE = R_f + \beta \times (F_1(R_f) - R_f)$$



$$RoE = F_2(R_f)$$

} ≠ CAPM

## (iv) DGM

**A**ER 2013, 2018 (WPs 2021) – Repeatedly sceptical

**B**rattle Report 2020 – Opinion only

& there have been decisions since the report with significantly lower WACCs

**C**omplexity – 
$$P_c = \frac{m \times E(D_c)}{(1+k)^{m/2}} + \sum_{t=1}^N \frac{E(D_t)}{(1+k)^{m+t-0.5}} + \frac{\frac{E(D_N)(1+g)}{k-g}}{(1+k)^{m+N-0.5}}$$

Incongruous with  
simplicity of CAPM

**D**ata – No new evidence of substance

“change is not to be adopted lightly in  
the absence of compelling evidence”

– AER 2021, Overall RoR WP, p.22

**E**stimates – Highly sensitive to assumptions

See next slide

**F**uture – Regulatory processes in future

Marked by endless disputes  
over inputs

# HER & DGM estimates

HER = Historical Excess Return

DGM = Dividend Growth Model

Method	2018	2019	2020
HER – Arithmetic mean	6.0 – 6.6	5.8 – 6.4	6.0 – 6.5
HER – Geometric mean* <i>* excluding 1883-2017 estimates</i>	4.2 – 4.6	4.1 – 4.3	4.2 – 4.5
HER – Geometric mean** <i>** all estimated ranges</i>	4.2 – 5.0	4.1 – 4.9	4.2 – 4.9
DGM	5.96 – 8.59	6.42 – 9.83	7.07 – 10.79

← DGM estimates  
much higher &  
much more variable

*\* The HER geometric estimates for the longest estimation period (1883-2017) are consistently outliers*

Source: AER (2020) *Rate of return, Annual Update*, December. pp.14-15

# WHAT'S THE *REAL* PROBLEM?

It's the RFR that has led to lower allowed rates of the return – not the MRP (MRP has been stable).

**So let's talk about the RFR.**

Exposure to low interest rates (via the RFR in the CAPM) was/is a known risk to investors and so does not need to be compensated.

While low nominal interest rates are **not** a problem, negative real interest rates may present a problem when determining a regulated RoR.

If negative real interest rates are the problem, then fiddling with the MRP is not the relevant response.

# If the problem is negative real interest rates then...

...the solution involves dealing with negative real interest rates in the CAPM.

This can be done simply and most efficiently by putting a floor under the risk free rate,  $R_f$ .

Such a floor would ensure the  $R_f$  does not fall below the rate of expected inflation  $E(\pi)$  in the CAPM.

There's no need to continue entertaining confected debates about estimating the market risk premium (MRP).

# CAPM adjusted for negative real interest rates

Standard CAPM:  $RoE = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f)$

*Adjusted* CAPM:  $RoE = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f) - (1 - \beta)r_f$

where:  $r_f = R_f - E(\pi)$  if  $R_f < E(\pi)$   
[ie. when real interest rates are negative]

$r_f = 0$  if  $R_f \geq E(\pi)$   
[ie. when real interest rates are non-negative]

*\* See Appendix for algebraic derivation*

# Benefits of the adjusted CAPM

$$\text{Adjusted CAPM: } RoE = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f) - (1 - \beta) r_f$$

$$\text{where: } r_f = R_f - E(\pi) \text{ if } R_f < E(\pi)$$

$$r_f = 0 \text{ if } R_f \geq E(\pi)$$

## Benefits

- It addresses a problem, not a complaint.
- It's a fixed formula.
- Can be readily written into the RORI.
- Would apply over life of RORI.
- Kicks-in automatically, and only, when circumstances dictate.
- Uses existing variables (ie. already used in the regulatory model)
- No discretion required, so no new debates about methodology.
- It's incentive-neutral.



# CONCLUSION



RFR is the source of volatility in the RoR, not the MRP.

It's time *once-and-for-all* for the AER to stop entertaining specious arguments for changing how it estimates the MRP.

Exposure to low interest rates (via the CAPM) was/is a known risk to investors and so does not need to be compensated.

Negative real interest rates may be more of a problem when determining a regulated RoE. If negative real interest rates are a problem, then fiddling with the MRP is not the relevant solution.

The 'adjusted CAPM' proposed above directly targets the problem of negative real interest rates in a way that:

- is principled and non-arbitrary
- involves the simplest, non-arbitrary adjustment to the model
- can be applied simply and transparently.

We would welcome the opportunity to discuss implementation of an amended CAPM.

## Appendix: Algebraic derivation

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Std CAPM: } RoE &= R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f) \\ &= (1 - \beta) R_f + \beta R_m\end{aligned}$$

If real interests rates are negative,  $R_f < E(\pi)$ , then replace  $R_f$  with  $E(\pi)$

$$= (1 - \beta) E(\pi) + \beta R_m$$

some algebraic manipulation

$$= (1 - \beta) E(\pi) - [ (1 - \beta) R_f - (1 - \beta) R_f ] + \beta R_m$$

and rearranging gives:

$$\text{Adj CAPM: } RoE = R_f + \beta (R_m - R_f) - (1 - \beta) r_f$$

where

$$r_f = R_f - E(\pi) \text{ if } R_f < E(\pi)$$

$$r_f = 0 \text{ if } R_f \geq E(\pi)$$