

# NEED/OPPORTUNITY STATEMENT (NOS)



Sydney North West 330 kV Special Protection System (SPS)

NOS- 000000001491 revision 2.0

**Ellipse project description:** Sydney NthWest 330kV Smart Grid Controls

**TRIM file:** [TRIM No]

**Project reason:** Imposed Standards - Control Systems to meet NER requirements

**Project category:** Prescribed - Augmentation

## Approvals

Author	Owen Crampton	Project Feasibility Engineer
Reviewed	Ronny Schnapp	Network & Connection Analysis Engineer
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Approved	Andrew Kingsmill	Manager / Network Planning
Date submitted for approval	9 January 2017	

# 1. Background

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The National Electricity Rules (NER) requires TransGrid to consider the effects of non-credible (e.g. multiple) contingencies which may give rise to cascading failures. AEMO, AEMC and TransGrid have all identified the need for investment to prevent or minimise the effects of interruptions following a non-credible event.

## NER Requirements

TransGrid is required to operate the NSW transmission system according to the provisions of the NER. The NSW main system is planned and operated taking into account single credible contingencies defined under Clause S5.1.2.1 of the NER:

*Network Service Providers must plan, design, maintain and operate their transmission networks and distribution networks to allow the transfer of power from generating units to Customers with all facilities or equipment associated with the power system in service and may be required by a Registered Participant under a connection agreement to continue to allow the transfer of power with certain facilities or plant associated with the power system out of service, whether or not accompanied by the occurrence of certain faults (called credible contingency events).*

In addition to planning for and managing credible contingencies, Clause S5.1.8 of the NER specifies requirements for non-credible contingencies including provision for emergency controls to minimise disruption to the transmission network and to significantly reduce the probability of cascading failure:

*In planning a network a Network Service Provider must consider non-credible contingency events such as busbar faults which result in tripping of several circuits, uncleared faults, double circuit faults and multiple contingencies which could potentially endanger the stability of the power system. In those cases where the consequences to any network or to any Registered Participant of such events are likely to be severe disruption a Network Service Provider and/or a Registered Participant must install emergency controls within the Network Service Provider's or Registered Participant's system or in both, as necessary, to minimise disruption to any transmission or distribution network and to significantly reduce the probability of cascading failure. In the event of a partial or system wide collapse, there are potential impacts, including market impacts, associated with the loss of intra-regional or inter-regional transfers, loss of supply to large load areas and high market prices.*

## AEMO review

AEMO has undertaken a study under existing and future load growth and generation scenarios and has identified several non-credible contingencies which may result in voltage and/or frequency collapse within the NSW transmission system. AEMO commissioned a report titled *Potential sites for emergency control schemes (ECS) in the NEM* – 29 April 2013. This report states that significant stability constraints may arise under a number of non-credible conditions and states that these conditions show potential for the implementation of emergency control schemes to prevent widespread impacts on the network.

## AEMC review

On 4 August 2010, the AEMC published the final report for the *Review of the Effectiveness of NEM Security and Reliability Arrangements in light of Extreme Weather Events*. This report was commissioned in response to an extreme weather event (heat wave) in late January 2009 in Victoria and South Australia which resulted in supply interruptions to business and residential customers.

The Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) (now the Standing Council on Energy and Resources (SCER)) provided a review of this report in June 2012. In this review the SCER supported further review of reliability and planning standards, including the NER to consider high impact-low probability events caused by Extreme Weather Events such as bushfires, drought or lightning which may result in significant loss of supply.


## NSW experience

During drought conditions in 2001, widespread bushfires in NSW caused four of the six 330 kV circuits south of Bayswater and Liddell power stations to trip repeatedly. The affected line pairs were 31/32 between Bayswater and Sydney, and 81/82 between Liddell and Newcastle.

Under these conditions, the Network Controller switched the circuits back into service to the extent permitted by the fires, and just managed to avoid a system voltage collapse by restoring one circuit only 50 seconds before a second parallel circuit tripped. Similarly, during bushfires in December 2002, various combinations of three, four and five concurrent line outages occurred in the network. The outages usually involved the line pairs 21/22 between the Central Coast and Sydney North, 25/26 between the Central Coast and Sydney West, 5A1/5A2 (500 kV) between Eraring and Kemps Creek, and 76/78 between Wallerawang and Sydney South. These historical events indicate that multiple contingencies have a realistic probability of occurring.

While 60 percent of NSW energy is generated west of the Great Dividing Range, it must be delivered to the east coast where most of the state's load is located. The Sydney, Wollongong and Newcastle areas use 75 percent of the total energy used in NSW. A geographic diagram showing the transmission network power flows in these areas is provided below in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Power Flows into the Sydney /Newcastle/ Wollongong Load Area**



TransGrid studies have identified critical non-credible contingencies of two or more of these 330 kV lines: 21 Tuggerah – Sydney North, 22 Vales Point – Sydney North, 2M Munmorah - Tuggerah, 25 Eraring – Vineyard,

## 2. Need/opportunity

## 2.1 Risks

The risk cost was calculated using the Risk Tool, and considers the worst-case outage of multiple 330 kV lines within the Sydney North West cut-set shown in Figure 2 causing a loss of load of 3,000 MW<sup>1</sup>. The load restoration time is estimated to be 8 hours<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, during works to restore the load, it is expected that the demand will decrease over time, as such a factor of 0.5 is used to account for this. The probability of such an event occurring is deemed to be 1 in 100 years<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> It is assumed that this type of outage is a 1 in 100 year event.

### **Unserved Energy Risk Cost**

Unserved energy is calculated as:

$$\text{Unserved Energy} = (\text{MW at risk} * 0.5 * \text{failure duration}) * (\text{overall failure rate})$$

$$\text{Unserved Energy} = (3000 \text{ MW} * 0.5 * 8 \text{ hrs}) * 1\%$$

$$\therefore \text{Unserved Energy} = 120 \text{ MWh}$$

The risk cost of unserved energy has been calculated as follows:

$$\text{Risk Cost of Unserved Energy} = \text{Unserved Energy} * \text{VCR}$$

$$\text{Risk Cost of Unserved Energy} = 320 \text{ MWh} * \$38,350/\text{MWh}^4$$

$$\therefore \text{Risk Cost of Unserved Energy} = \$4.6 \text{ million per year}$$

### **Total Risk Cost**

$$\therefore \text{Total risk cost} = \$4.6 \text{ million per annum.}$$

## **3. Related needs/opportunities**

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- > Need 1472 – Yass Area 330 kV Smart Grid Control
- > Need 1473 – North West 330kV Smart Grid Control
- > Need 1482 – Sydney South 330 kV Smart Grid Controls
- > Need 1484 – Snowy 330 kV Area Smart Grid Control
- > Need 1487 – Eraring 500 kV Smart Grid Control
- > Need 1522 – Sydney West Area 330 kV Smart Grid Control

## **4. Recommendation**

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It is recommended that options be evaluated to take the opportunity to address the potential for voltage collapse in the greater Sydney Area during the 2018/19 to 2022/23 Regulatory Control Period.

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<sup>4</sup> TransGrid's Investment Risk Tool bases the Value of Customer Reliability (VCR) on figures published by AEMO in its Value of Customer Reliability Review - Final Report, September 2014. In this case we use the mixed residential/industrial figure of \$38,350/MWh.

## Attachment 1 Risk costs summary

### Current Option Assessment - Risk Summary

Project Name: Sydney North West 330kV Special Protection System (SPS)

Option Name: 1491 - Base case

Option Assessment Name: 1491 - Base case - Assessment 1

Rev Reset Period: Next (2018-23)



Major Component	No.	Minor Component	Sel. Hazardous Event	LoC x CoF (\$M)	Failure Mechanism	NoxLoC x CoF (\$M)	PoF (Yr 1)	Total Risk (\$M)	Risk (\$M) (Rel)	Risk (\$M) (Op)	Risk (\$M) (Fin)	Risk (\$M) (Peo)	Risk (\$M) (Env)	Risk (\$M) (Rep)
Conductor	1	Conductor (inc Joints)	Unplanned Outage - HV (Conductor)	\$460.41	Break	\$460.41	1.00%	\$4.60	\$4.60		\$0.00			\$0.00
				\$460.41		\$460.41		\$4.60	\$4.60		\$0.00			\$0.00

Total VCR Risk: \$4.60

Total ENS Risk: